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QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
1 OVERVIEW
The slowdown in world activity that began in early 2018 and intensified in the second 
half of the year has become increasingly patent in 2019 to date. The global expansion 
has lost steam amid persistent trade tensions and the gradual growth of areas of 
uncertainty. Moreover, the uneven performance of economic activity across the main areas 
has tended to be confirmed. The loss of momentum of euro area gross domestic product 
(GDP) contrasts with the ongoing relatively high dynamism of the US economy. In China, 
uncertainty persists as to how sharply its activity is slowing. Meanwhile, world trade 
contracted in the final stretch of 2018 and the latest indicators point to continued weakness 
at the beginning of this year. Globally, inflation rates continued on a downward trend 
governed by the behaviour of the energy component, while core inflation has generally 
held steady despite the continued strength of job creation.
Against this background, the main international bodies have tended to trim their 
GDP growth projections. There are, however, some differences in the persistence of the 
downward revisions. In some cases, activity is assumed to lose momentum only in the 
short term. The narrative of the various projections is that the observed slowdown has 
occurred because temporary shocks (the main recent European example is the new car 
exhaust emissions legislation) have coincided with factors which have dented agents’ 
confidence (such as protectionist tensions, vulnerabilities in some emerging economies –
most notably China– or uncertainties over the final outcome of Brexit or the course of 
economic policy in Italy). The basic difference is that, while some institutions consider that 
the effects of this loss of confidence will peter out in the next few quarters, others believe 
they will be more persistent.
Economic policies have reacted to the worsening outlook for activity. Set against 
doubts over global growth, emerging financial market tensions and scant domestic 
inflationary pressure, the Federal Reserve adopted a more cautious stance at the beginning 
of the year. It thus declined to commit itself to the previously envisaged path of normalisation. 
Other central banks followed suit and financial markets were calmed. In the case of China, 
the authorities adopted a package of fiscal, monetary and financial stimulus measures. 
In the euro area, economic activity remained weak at the beginning of 2019. The 
temporary domestic factors have had a longer-than-expected adverse effect. But the 
modest output growth is also explained by the severity with which the euro area has been 
hit by the world trade slump. This is because the euro area has a more open economy than 
other regions and because it specialises in exports to the geographical areas and products 
whose import flows have deteriorated most (see Box 2). Also, the impact on euro area 
exports seems to have begun to pass through to investment. These developments have 
seen a notable downward revision of the euro area’s growth prospects, particularly for 
2019. The ECB’s latest projections are, however, for GDP to resume higher growth from the 
second half of the year as the temporary factors wind down and the uncertainties fade. The 
prevailing factors would then be the elements underpinning recovery, such as favourable 
financial conditions, the expansionary behaviour of employment and wages, lower oil prices 
and a slight fiscal easing. The expected inflation path has also been revised downwards. 
Against this backdrop, on 7 March the European Central Bank (ECB) Governing 
Council decided on new measures to preserve the monetary stimulus. Specifically, it 
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extended the period during which it expects official rates to remain at their current levels 
and announced a new round of longer-term refinancing operations in order to maintain 
favourable credit conditions. As Box 4 illustrates, both the weaker macroeconomic 
scenario and the ECB’s decisions are reflected in a postponement of the date on which 
financial markets expect the first rise in official interest rates.
The Spanish economy has maintained its notable dynamism. The available information 
indicates that in the first quarter GDP grew by around 0.6%, a similar rate to that throughout 
2018. Spain was not immune to the external shock which, since the final stretch of the 
previous year, has manifested itself in a notable loss of export vigour. However, the 
dynamism of domestic demand offset the downturn in the external situation and activity 
has thus not slowed as in the euro area as a whole. In particular, private consumption has 
continued to exhibit notable strength, against a background of continuing swift job 
creation, an increase in purchasing power as a result of lower inflation (partly attributable 
to the oil price decline), a budgetary stimulus to household income (particularly in the 
second half of 2018) and a decrease in the rate of saving. By contrast, private investment 
has begun to feel the impact of the more unfavourable external situation. From the 
standpoint of the productive sectors, this development has also manifested itself in a 
worsening of manufacturing activity, while services have stood up better.
The current expansionary phase of the Spanish economy is expected to continue in 
the medium term. The baseline scenario underlying the updated macroeconomic 
projections of the Banco de España for the period 2019-2021 set out in Box 1 of this 
Report assumes that the global uncertainties will gradually peter out. The factors supporting 
activity include the assumption that the external markets will recover, the prevalence of 
benign financial conditions (favoured by the accommodative monetary policy stance) and, 
crucially, the progress made in restoring the macro-financial equilibrium of the economy 
(particularly the ongoing improvement of competitiveness, which is allowing a relatively 
high external balance to be maintained even in the current setting of worsening export 
In contrast to the deceleration in the euro area, activity continues to grow steadily in Spain. Inflation remains moderate, growing at rates somewhat below 
those of the euro area as a whole.
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
a Quarter-on-quarter rates of change based on seasonally adjusted series in the case of GDP, and year-on-year rates of change based on the original series in the 
case of consumer price indices.
b The figure for Q1 is a Banco de España projection.
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markets). In any event, the present projection is for GDP growth to gradually ease as 
monetary policy, while continuing to help sustain activity, exerts a lower impact on GDP 
growth than in the past. In particular, after growing by 2.2% in 2019, GDP will foreseeably 
grow by 1.9% and 1.7% in the following two years. 
Turning to inflation, the consumer price index slowed significantly from end-2018. In 
February the year-on-year rate of change of the harmonised index of consumer prices 
(HICP) was 1.1%. Core inflation, measured by the rate of change of the index including 
only the prices of non-energy industrial goods and services, which in that month grew by 
0.7%, continues to show no sign of rising. But in the projection period the growth rate of 
this indicator is expected to increase, reflecting a gradual rise in the positive output gap 
and higher unit labour costs, against a background of somewhat more expansionary wage 
behaviour.
The risks to projected activity are, in any event, tilted to the downside. In the external 
arena, the prospect of reaching agreement in the current US/China trade dispute has 
strengthened in recent months. Yet it cannot be ruled out that fresh protectionist tensions 
may emerge in other areas of the global economy. Moreover, risks persist that there will be 
a no-deal Brexit1 and that China’s more expansionary demand policies will prove insufficient 
to halt the deceleration of its economy. From a domestic perspective, the persisting 
uncertainty over future economic policies will only be vanquished when the executive and 
legislative powers appointed in the upcoming elections begin work under their mandate. 
The future economic policy agenda in Spain will have to focus on reducing the economy’s 
vulnerability to shocks and fostering potential growth. It must therefore inescapably 
include the need to resume the process of budgetary consolidation and the adoption of 
measures to ensure that the main product and factor markets function more efficiently.
2018 2019
2017 2018 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
National Accounts
Quarter-on-quarter rates of change, unless otherwise indicated
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Year-on-year rates of change
5.26.25.25.26.25.29.2tnemyolpmE    
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    Harmonised index of consumer prices excl. energy and unprocessed food 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.9
Price indicators (c)
MAIN MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES OF SPAIN (a) TABLE 1
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Information available up to 13 March 2019. The cells shaded in grey are Banco de España projections.
b Contribution to the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of GDP (pp).
c The 2019 Q1 figure is the average of the January and February year-on-year rates.
1  J. L. Vega (coord), Brexit: balance de situación y perspectivas, Documentos Ocasionales nº 1905, Banco de 
España.
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This box describes the key features of the most recent update of the 
Banco de España’s economic projections for the Spanish economy. 
In comparison with the previous projections, published on 14 December 
2018,1 the current projections incorporate the preliminary results of 
the quarterly national accounts for the fourth quarter of 2018 and the 
changes in the technical assumptions derived from the information 
collected since the last exercise (see Table 1).2 
The projections anticipate the prolongation of the upturn in the 
Spanish economy over the three-year period 2019-2021 (see 
Table 2). These expectations are based on the continued existence 
of the factors that have been underpinning growth since the start 
of the recovery including, in particular, the competitiveness 
improvements achieved since the start of the crisis, the 
strengthening of the financial situation of businesses, households 
and financial institutions and the accommodative stance of 
monetary policy. In addition, the prolongation, in the short run, of 
the expansionary budgetary policy stance should be mentioned. 
This combination of factors would allow the economy to continue 
to grow at significantly above its potential rate, which would 
facilitate further absorption of the high unemployment generated 
by the crisis.
That said, the buoyancy of activity will tend to moderate over the 
projection horizon. In terms of annual average rates, after growing 
by 2.5% in 2018, growth is projected to be 2.2% in 2019, 1.9% in 
2020 and 1.7% in 2021. As regards 2019, the slowdown basically 
reflects a deterioration in the external environment, which has 
been having a negative effect on exports since 2018 and which in 
the short run will contribute, through the impact on uncertainty, to 
a weakening in private demand (in particular, business investment). 
In the medium and long run, various factors explain the projected 
moderation in the rate of growth. First, although monetary policy 
will continue to be expansionary, the effects on GDP growth of the 
measures implemented in this area in recent years will gradually 
decline. The convergence towards a more neutral monetary policy 
stance is now expected to be notably more gradual than was 
anticipated three months ago, as a result of the downward shift in 
the path of short-term interest rates expected by the markets. This 
is partly a consequence of the action taken by the ECB to guide 
agents’ expectations and, in particular, of the decisions adopted 
by the Governing Council on 7 March.3
BOX 1MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR SPAIN (2019-2021)
1  Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2018-2021): the 
Banco de España’s contribution to the Eurosystem’s December 2018 
joint forecasting exercise.
2  The cut-off date for the December 2018 projections was 21 November 
2018. The cut-off date for the present exercise is 7 March 2018, except 
for the data on export markets and the prices of competitors in their 
national currency, which were taken from the ECB staff macroeconomic 
projections for the euro area, March 2019, which had a cut-off date of 12 
February 2019. 
3  See Box 4 (“Market expectations about the euro area benchmark interest 
rate”) and Section 3.2 of this Quarterly Report.
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Monetary and financial conditions
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    (2000 = 100 and percentage differences)
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Difference between current
projections and December
2018 projections (b)
March 2019 projections
Table 1
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rates of change, unless otherwise indicated
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Assumptions cut-off date: 7 March 2019. The figures expressed as levels are annual averages; the figures expressed as rates are calculated based on the relevant 
annual averages. 
b Differences are between rates in the case of world output and export markets, between levels in the case of oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate, percen-
tages for the effective nominal exchange rate and in percentage points in the case of interest rates.
c A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
d For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared using the Eurosystem's methodology. These assumptions are based on 
futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these variables.
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BOX 1MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR SPAIN (2019-2021)  (cont’d)
Also, although the expansionary fiscal measures approved since 
mid-2018 will support growth in the short run, in the absence of 
budget plans a neutral fiscal stance has been assumed for longer 
horizons. Finally, the projections incorporate the assumption that, 
given the current setting of continued relatively high levels of 
uncertainty and, above all, the historically low level of the savings 
ratio, households will be somewhat more cautious in their spending 
decisions. As a result, consumption dynamism is expected to 
moderate somewhat.
As for inflation, the extension of the upturn, with GDP growth rates 
above potential, is expected to lead to a gradual widening of the 
positive output gap and, therefore, to a rise in core inflation, as 
measured by the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP), 
excluding food and energy. Specifically, the annual average rate of 
change of this indicator is projected to be 1.1% in 2019, 1.6% in 
2020 and 1.8% in 2021. The path of the overall HICP is not very 
different, given the expected behaviour of the energy component.
In comparison with the preceding projections, the most important 
change in the assumptions on which the forecasts are based, in 
terms of the impact on the final variables, is some deterioration in the 
outlook for Spain’s export markets. This is reflected in a downward 
revision of 0.9 percentage points (pp), in cumulative terms, in the 
growth of these markets over the time horizon considered (see 
Table  1). Other changes, in the opposite direction, counteract the 
negative impact on activity arising from this revision. There has been 
a downward shift in the expected path of oil prices (measured in US 
Difference between current
projections and December
2018 projections
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Unemployment rate (% of labour force).
End-of-period data
14.4 14.0 12.8 12.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Unemployment rate (% of labour force).
Annual average
15.3 14.2 13.2 12.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Nation's net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) (% of GDP) 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1
General goverment's net lending (+) / net borrowing (-)
(% of GDP)
-2.7 -2.5 -2.0 -1.8 -0.1 0.0 0.0
March 2019 projections
Table 2
PROJECTIONS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY'S MAIN MACRO MAGNITUDES (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
Latest QNA data: 2018 Q4
a Projections cut-off date: 13 March 2019.
b Includes machinery, capital goods, weapons systems, cultivated biological resources and intellectual property products.
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BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR SPAIN (2019-2021)  (cont’d)
dollars), which is beneficial to growth in the real incomes of private 
agents. At the same time, the expected paths of interbank market 
interest rates and public debt yields have moved downwards since 
the cut-off date for the assumptions of the preceding projections. 
Thus, although the cost of financing is expected to rise somewhat 
over the projection horizon, it is now not expected to rise by as much 
as three months ago.
Turning to budgetary policy, the changes in the assumptions are 
small. On 1 January 2019, the 2018 State budget was extended 
into 2019. This extension was accompanied by various royal 
decrees and remains in force following the rejection by Parliament 
on 13 February of the draft State budget for 2019 presented in 
January. These decrees included measures relating, in particular, 
to the updating of pensions, an increase in public sector wages, a 
rise in contribution bases (7%, in the case of the maximum base 
and in line with the increase in the national minimum wage, in the 
case of the minimum base) and changes in the arrangements for 
self-employed workers.4 However, only the latter two measures 
amount to changes with respect to the previous projections 
exercise, since the others had already been announced before the 
cut-off date for such projections and were incorporated in them. 
Also, more recently, the Government has approved further 
expansionary measures, including notably the extension of 
benefits to unemployed persons over the age of 52 and the 
extension of paternity leave to eight weeks.
Apart from the measures already adopted, it was decided, as in 
other recent projection exercises, to use technical assumptions to 
obtain the expected path of fiscal variables. The items of the 
general government accounts subject to most discretionality 
(including notably, due to their size, government consumption and 
public investment) are assumed to change in line with the nominal 
potential growth of the economy, while the path of other items is 
linked to the behaviour of their usual determinants. In particular, it 
is assumed that public revenues will grow in line with tax bases, 
which mainly depend on the macroeconomic environment. For 
less discretionary items of spending, including the measures 
recently approved by royal decree law, similar assumptions are 
proposed. As a result, it is assumed that pension spending 
changes in line with the increases approved for 2019 and, 
subsequently, will be determined by the legally established formula 
for increases and by population ageing. At the same time, 
unemployment benefit is linked to the behaviour of unemployment, 
and debt interest payments to the behaviour of public debt and 
the cost of borrowing.5 In accordance with all these assumptions 
for the behaviour of budgetary variables and with the output gap 
estimated consistently with the other macroeconomic projections, 
fiscal policy will be expansionary in 2019. The budget deficit is 
projected to fall slightly in 2019, to 2.5% (0.2 pp less than in 2018), 
this being a slight upward revision (of 0.1 pp) with respect to the 
previous forecast, and subsequently somewhat more sharply, to 
reach 1.8% by the end of the forecast horizon.
The projected average annual GDP growth rates are unchanged 
from December. The main reason for this stability is that the overall 
impact on activity of the changes described in the assumptions 
that form the basis for the projections is more or less neutral. 
Moreover, as regards 2019, there are factors with the opposite 
sign that offset each other, so that the GDP growth projection 
remains at 2.2%. On the one hand, at the end of 2018 growth was 
somewhat more favourable than anticipated in previous 
projections. Also, the short-term information indicates that the 
economy remained buoyant in 2019 Q1, when GDP growth is 
estimated to have been 0.6%. On the other hand, activity is 
expected to be less buoyant in Q2 and Q3, in comparison with the 
December projections, as a consequence of the continued 
weakness of the euro area economy at the beginning of the year, 
as reflected in the recent ECB staff projections.6 
For the two-year period 2020-2021, the lack of revisions to GDP 
growth is explained by the fact that, in line with these projections 
for the euro area, it is assumed that the factors that have caused 
euro area activity to weaken are predominantly temporary, and will 
therefore cease to operate from the end of this year, assuming that 
the main areas of risk arising from the global environment will not 
fully materialise. 
As for inflation, the net effect of the new assumptions is, as in the 
case of activity, approximately neutral. However, the recent 
surprising behaviour of the core component, which suggests that 
the degree of pass-through to prices of the observed rise in the 
growth rate of unit labour costs has been lower than was expected 
in the December projections, justifies a downward revision to the 
path of core inflation. This revision should be more pronounced at 
the beginning than at the end of the projection period, as the 
ongoing decline in the degree of slack in the economy will cause 
inflationary pressures to rise.
Growth in activity will continue to be driven by national demand, 
although the latter’s positive contribution to GDP growth will tend to 
moderate gradually over the forecast horizon. By contrast, the 
negative contribution of external demand to GDP growth, which was 
relatively large in 2018, will gradually decline, to reach zero in 2021. 
Within national demand, the buoyancy of private consumption will 
continue to be supported by strong job creation. Also, the growth 
rate of household income will be driven by the projected rise in real 
wages and, in the short term, by the stimulus from the budgetary 
4  Also incorporated in the projections for 2019 is the fact that a significant 
part of the impact of the changes in personal income tax approved in the 
budget for 2018 has, contrary to what was expected, still not been 
observed in the budget outturn data and has therefore been shifted to 
the current year.
5  An increase in public spending in 2018 was included in the December 
projections as a result of a Supreme Court judgment annulling the 
privatisation of Aigües del Ter i Llobregat, which took place in 2012. In 
practice, the increase in spending has been recorded in 2012, which 
resulted in a reduction in spending last year. Also, the income from the 
re-tendering of the insolvent toll motorways, which was previously 
expected in 2019 but is now expected later, has been excluded. 6  ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, March 2019.
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BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR SPAIN (2019-2021)  (cont’d)
measures approved in 2018 and early 2019. In comparison with 
the December projections, the slight upward revision to the growth 
rate of private consumption reflects the increase in the purchasing 
power of nominal household income against a background in 
which, as mentioned above, price increases are more contained 
than they were forecast to be three months ago. In any case, 
private consumption is expected to slow gradually, due to a 
number of different factors. First, as already indicated, the current 
projections incorporate the assumption that, in an environment of 
greater global uncertainty, households will tend to raise their 
savings ratio, which is currently close to its all-time low. Also, the 
propensity to consume increases in employment income will tend 
to be lower than in the recent past. This is because such increases 
derive to a greater extent from rises in real wages than from job 
creation and the propensity to consume is lower for the former 
than for the latter. The final factor underlying the projected 
slowdown in private consumption is the completion of the process 
of taking the decisions to acquire the durable and semi-durable 
goods whose acquisition had been postponed during the crisis.
Favourable funding conditions will continue to support the 
expansionary behaviour of the various components of investment. 
In particular, residential investment is expected to continue to 
grow at high rates, driven by buoyant household creation and 
vigorous job creation. That said, the momentum of this aggregate 
is expected to gradually decline over the projection horizon.
The growth of business investment will be based on the strength 
of final demand, the high capacity utilisation and the sustained 
balance sheet clean-up in the sector. However, this component is 
also expected to slow somewhat, in line with the reduced strength 
of final demand and the outlook of continuing moderate export 
growth, which will limit the investment spending of firms with a 
high proportion of foreign sales. In comparison with the December 
projections, the downward revision to this component is more 
pronounced than for the other components of private demand, 
since it is affected more directly by the increase in uncertainty in 
the rest of the world.
The projected improvement in the contribution of the external 
sector to GDP growth is based on the expected increase in export 
dynamism. Exports weakened very significantly in 2018, by more 
than their markets, due to predominantly temporary factors. These 
include the delayed impact on sales outside the euro area of the 
euro depreciation in 2017 and the recovery in tourist flows to 
certain competitor countries in the Mediterranean basin. The 
disappearance of these effects should allow the market share 
gains that have been recorded for most of the recovery, as a 
consequence of the competitiveness gains accumulated since the 
start of the crisis and the increase in regular exporters, to resume. 
However, as mentioned when describing the changes to the 
assumptions, the deterioration in the external environment has led 
to a downward revision to expected growth in external markets. 
This is reflected in lower expected export growth than in the 
December projections. As in December, the import projections 
incorporate the assumption that the elasticity of this final demand 
component will be somewhat higher than during the initial years of 
the recovery (although lower than in the last two years). 
The weakening of GDP growth rates over the projection horizon 
will be accompanied by a loss of momentum in employment of 
similar magnitude, except in the short term, when the slowdown in 
employment will tend to be intensified by the impact of the 
increase in the national minimum wage at the beginning of 2019. 
Continued job creation will allow further reductions in the 
unemployment rate, although their magnitude will be reduced by 
the rise in the labour force. Current projections envisage a fall in 
the unemployment rate to 12% by the end of the projection 
horizon, similar to the level expected three months ago.
On currently available information, the Spanish economy’s net 
lending is expected to fall in 2018 by approximately 1 pp to around 
1.2% of GDP, as a result of the decline in real flows of goods and 
services and the deterioration in the real terms of trade, basically 
due to the rise in oil prices. During the projection period a further 
modest decline is expected in the nation’s net lending, of 0.5 pp of 
GDP to 2021, similar to the reduction expected three months ago. 
The growth of compensation per employee is expected to be 
significantly higher during the projection period than in recent 
years. This reflects the gradual reduction in labour market slack, 
wage settlements, as at mid-2018, under the collective bargaining 
agreement for the period 2018-2020 (which recommends annual 
rises of 2% plus a variable component) and, in 2019, the increase 
in the national minimum wage. The pick-up in compensation per 
employee, against a background of continuing low productivity 
growth, will lead to higher unit labour cost growth rates. Despite 
the projected containment of profit margins, this will increase 
domestic inflationary pressures. By contrast, those of external 
origin, as measured by the import deflator, are expected to weaken 
in the short run. 
Specifically, in terms of consumer prices, the energy component has 
slowed significantly since the end of last year, due to the fall in oil 
prices in the latter part of 2018 and the base effects deriving from 
their previous rise. This trend is projected to intensify during 2019. 
For the rest of the projection horizon, according to futures prices, the 
expected path of oil prices has a mildly negative profile. This, 
combined with the assumptions for electricity prices, is expected to 
produce rates of change in the energy component of close to zero. 
Given these developments, the rate of change of the HICP will fall 
slightly in the short run, increasing gradually thereafter in line with 
core inflation. Thus, the average annual rate of change of the HICP is 
expected to be 1.2% in 2019, 1.6% in 2020 and 1.7% in 2021.
The risks to the central growth scenario are on the downside, 
mainly as a result of external uncertainties. In particular, as already 
mentioned, the prospects for short-term growth in Spanish export 
markets have been revised downwards, in line with recent activity 
data for the world (and, in particular, for the euro area, Spain’s 
main trading partner), and are now less favourable than they were 
assumed to be three months ago. At the same time, the hypotheses 
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BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR SPAIN (2019-2021)  (cont’d)
regarding the future behaviour of Spanish export markets (deriving 
from the latest ECB staff forecasting exercise) consider that the 
recent slowdown is temporary and will be reversed in the second 
half of the year. However, the recent activity weakness, especially 
in the euro area, could be more persistent, leading to a less 
favourable performance by the Spanish economy than envisaged 
in the central scenario. 
In addition, a number of risk factors persist that would lead to less 
favourable developments were they to materialise. Specifically, 
the lack of clarity regarding the terms of the United Kingdom’s 
departure from the European Union means that certain scenarios 
that could have very severe consequences for both areas cannot 
be completely ruled out. Also, uncertainty persists regarding the 
possible adoption of new protectionist measures at global level 
that would distort world production and result in the revision of 
business investment plans. Finally, the Chinese authorities are 
facing the difficulty of balancing fiscal and monetary stimulus for 
the economy, to alleviate the current slowdown, with attempting to 
halt the rise in the indebtedness of private and public agents.
Domestically, a high degree of uncertainty persists regarding the 
future economic policy stance and, in particular, fiscal adjustment 
(which is needed to reduce the high level of public debt that is still 
one of the main sources of vulnerability for the Spanish economy) 
and the adoption of measures to raise the long-run potential 
growth rate. Also, continuation of the current upturn requires that 
the competitiveness gains relative to the rest of the world achieved 
in recent years be maintained. It would therefore be desirable for 
wage rises to reflect the specific circumstances of each firm or 
sector and, in particular, productivity growth, avoiding general 
economy-wide increases that bear no relation to such specific 
conditions. In addition, price and wage setting mechanisms 
should be sufficiently flexible to allow adaptation, where necessary, 
to a more pronounced slowdown in activity, so as to limit possible 
activity and employment losses.
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The negative trend of euro area exports contributes notably to 
explaining the sluggishness of activity observed throughout 2018. 
The slowdown in exports came about against a background of 
less buoyant world trade, associated with the loss of momentum 
in global activity and with the heightening of trade tensions that 
affected business confidence and investment. For the year on 
average, global trade (excluding euro area imports) grew by 4%, 
compared with 5.6% in 2017. Moreover, the rate of increase of this 
variable weakened notably as 2018 unfolded (excepting a 
transitory rebound in the central months), with negative rates 
being posted at year-end, a relatively uncommon phenomenon in 
the time series (see Chart 1). 
This slowdown in world trade has fed through sharply to exports 
and to the activity of the European economies, with fairly 
generalised slackness apparent. In the area as a whole, sales of 
goods targeted on the rest of the world grew by 2% in 2018 
(against 4.3% in 2017)1, with end-year real rates of increase below 
1% (in year-on-year terms) and reductions in some countries such 
as Germany, Italy and Spain. In parallel, output in the industrial 
sectors, which is generally more export-oriented than that in 
services, posted moderate growth over the year as a whole. 
The high degree of trade openness of the European economies 
plays a significant role in explaining the impact of the slowdown in 
world trade on euro area economic activity. As Chart 2 shows, the 
average degree of openness of the euro area countries (excluding 
intra-area trade) is far higher than that of the United States and 
even exceeds that of China. Admittedly, the creation of the euro 
area has led to greater trade among its member countries; but the 
rise in exports to markets outside the area has been even greater. 
Thus, the share of extra-euro exports in total exports increased 
from 48% in 2000 to 55% in 2018. During this period, there was a 
notable increase in the weight of exports to Asia (to China in 
particular) and to the rest of the EU countries not belonging to the 
euro area (such as Poland, Romania and Hungary), areas whose 
significance currently exceeds that of other traditional export 
markets such as the United States and the United Kingdom.2
A key factor behind the weakness of euro area exports in 2018 is 
the relatively less dynamic behaviour of the economies which, at 
present, are comparatively more significant in the euro area 
foreign trade structure in terms of geographical specialisation. 
Specifically, there has been a contraction in sales to the United 
Kingdom over the past year, compounding the weakness recorded 
since 2016 when the Brexit referendum was held (see Chart 3). 
Adding to this, in 2018, was the notable slowdown in exports to 
the rest of the EU, to Russia and to China. At a greater level of 
disaggregation, there was a notable decline in exports to Turkey 
(which technically went into recession in late 2018, and saw its 
currency depreciate sharply) and to other Asian countries, all of 
which are comparatively important markets for the euro area. 
Conversely, exports to the United States were robust, despite the 
trade tensions with this country. The upshot was a significantly 
sharper easing in euro area foreign demand3 than that observed 
in global trade (see Chart 4).
Trade specialisation by product may also have checked the growth 
of exports. In particular, the difficulties the automobile industry has 
undergone (owing to the adaptation to new emissions rules and 
uncertainty over the structural transition from diesel to new 
technologies) have, given their high weight in the euro area’s total 
exports, adversely impacted sales abroad, especially in Germany 
(which accounts for more than 50% of total euro area car exports). 
Also, the slowdown in China, in transition towards a growth model 
based more on consumption and less on investment, has 
negatively affected euro area exports, given the high weight of 
capital goods in sales targeted on China (see Chart 5). 
Lastly, a further factor that may have curbed export growth in 
2018, especially in the first half of the year, is the euro appreciation 
in nominal effective terms against its trading partners in 2017.4 
That would explain why the easing in extra-euro area exports was, 
generally, sharper than that recorded by the respective export 
markets. This loss in share was across the board, with the 
exception of France, whose sales abroad trended somewhat more 
favourably than the attendant foreign demand (see Chart 6). 
In short, the high degree of openness of the euro area economies, 
along with the geographical orientation and the product-based 
specialisation of their exports, has made the euro area particular 
sensitive to external shocks and to the slowdown in world trade. 
Looking ahead, the uncertainty over the possible escalation in 
protectionist measures paints a complex picture for European 
exports, especially in a setting, such as the present, marked by 
worsening global economic prospects. Among the most significant 
factors are the findings of the research by the US authorities on 
car imports from Europe, which might see higher tariffs on this 
type of product, and the hypothetical effects of diverted trade 
which a future bilateral trade pact between China and the United 
States could have on the euro area. 
BOX 2THE IMPACT OF THE SLOWDOWN IN WORLD TRADE ON EURO AREA EXPORTS 
1  Cumulative growth in the year, with data to November 2018.
2  The composition of exports evidences other differences from country to 
country. Specifically, while in Italy and in France the weight of extra-euro 
area exports stands at around the average, in Germany it is higher 
(63%), and in Spain and Portugal lower (47% and 35%, respectively). 
There are also differences when specific destinations are considered: in 
Germany, exports to China have a greater weight (at the expense of 
Africa and the Middle East); and in Spain, Latin America, Africa, the 
Middle East and the United Kingdom are more important, and the United 
States, emerging Asia and other EU countries less so. 
3  Euro area foreign demand is obtained by weighting the imports from 
different world regions (based on the Central Planning Bureau series), 
taking the weight of sales to each of them in extra-euro area exports. 
4  The econometric models available suggest that exchange rate 
movements take between three and four quarters to be reflected in the 
behaviour of exports. Hence, it is estimated that the appreciation of the 
euro in 2017 had an adverse impact on export growth in 2018, and a 
virtually zero effect in 2017. 
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BOX 2 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE SLOWDOWN IN WORLD TRADE ON EURO AREA EXPORTS (cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España, World Bank, Central Planning Bureau, Eurostat and World Trade Organization.
a Exports plus imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP.
b Other EU refers to EU countries (Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Hungary and Romania) that do not belong to the euro area, except United Kingdom.
c Extra-euro area export market share is the ratio of the extra-euro area exports of each country to its euro area foreign demand.
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The real estate market is key to explaining cyclical developments 
in the US economy. Nine of the 11 recessions experienced in the 
United States since the Second World War have been preceded by 
a significant slowdown in the housing market.1 Against this 
background, and especially bearing in mind the still-fresh memory 
of the role of this market in the origins of the 2008 economic and 
financial crisis, the real estate slowdown of late is arousing some 
concern. This box assesses the scale of the recent loss of 
momentum in the US housing market and its determinants. Its aim 
is to shed light on its relevance as a factor of risk for the 
prolongation of the US economy’s current upturn. 
Residential investment has in fact been slowing continuously in 
recent years, currently posting practically zero growth rates (Chart 
1). This reduction in the contribution of housebuilding to GDP 
growth has been accompanied by a continuing upward path of 
house prices (Chart 2). There are certain demand factors behind 
this diminished activity in the residential market. Admittedly, the 
sound behaviour of the labour market, in terms of the decline in 
the unemployment rate to historical lows and sustained wage 
growth, is a powerful source of support for house purchases. But 
opinion-based surveys show that consumers do not think the 
current moment is a good one for buying a house.2
Part of the explanation lies in the consequences of monetary 
policy normalisation for the cost of mortgage financing. And this 
has been reflected in the lower pace of house sales and of the flow 
of new credit. As Chart 3 shows, since late 2016 the fixed interest 
rate on 30-year mortgages (the most usual form of financing in the 
US market3), has risen by more than 100 bp to around 4.5%. If 
price developments are added to the cost of financing, the 
outcome is that the housing affordability index is in its most 
unfavourable position since the financial crisis broke (as the blue 
line in the chart shows). In addition, the 2017 tax reform (the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act) has contributed to making house purchases 
dearer by limiting the maximum amount of tax-deductible 
mortgage expenses. Buyers with lower incomes or with fewer 
savings for the initial down payment have seen their access to the 
market limited as the stricter lending standards in force in the 
wake of the crisis have become binding for a higher proportion of 
potential buyers. In the case of the youngest cohort, a further 
factor limiting home buying possibilities is the worsening of their 
credit ratings as a result of the rapid rise in the outstanding balance 
of student debt (Chart 4).4
True, the loss of dynamism in the US residential market is 
essentially in response to demand-side factors. But these have 
been compounded by various supply-related factors. First, there 
has recently been a notable increase in construction costs, which 
have coincided with the scarcity of skilled labour in the sector.5 
Second, tighter land use regulations have, along with building 
constraints, contributed to the shortage of plots available for 
house building and to making them dearer, particularly in areas 
closest to city centres.6 The upshot has been the stagnation of 
housing starts and the slowdown in residential investment 
spending (see Chart 5). Moreover, the construction of new housing 
has tended to be concentrated in the dearest market segment, 
that which continues to have the highest returns.7 Hence, despite 
the slowdown in demand, new houses placed on the market do 
not cover the existing demand in this segment, and the overhang 
of housing stock has fallen to historically low levels (see Chart 6). 
Supply shortages have translated into price increases which, 
since 2012, have persistently outgrown household incomes 
(Chart  5). But, moreover, supply/demand mismatches tend to 
exacerbate the heterogeneity of the different market segments. 
This is particularly so at the regional level, which is more 
pronounced than in other countries, owing to the strong domestic 
migratory flows towards cities and, especially, towards 
metropolitan areas on both coasts. As a result, prices are very 
uneven. Some geographical areas have accumulated rises in 
excess of 180% since 2000, coexisting alongside others where 
this increase is below 25% (see Chart 7). 
Looking ahead, the prospect of the recent downturn in the 
residential market leading to a sharp correction, such as that in the 
wake of the financial crisis, appears limited. This is because there 
are marked differences between the current situation of the 
residential market and that of the previous cycle. Firstly, at least at 
the national level, the rates of construction of new houses and of 
household formation are aligned, denoting that, unlike the previous 
cycle, the dynamics of the residential sector are underpinned by 
fundamentals and are, therefore, more sustainable. Secondly, the 
adjustment of the sector following the crisis has meant that its 
weight in US GDP is much less compared with the previous cycle. 
That restricts the scale of the impact of any downturn in activity in 
this sector on the rest of the economy. Specifically, the weight of 
residential investment in GDP currently stands below 4%, 
somewhat down on the historical average (of 4.6% since 1951), 
and clearly below the high of 6.7% attained at the height of the 
previous real estate cycle. Thirdly, household debt is now much 
more moderate. Compared with the pre-crisis high, the total and 
mortgage debt of households as a percentage of their disposable 
income has respectively fallen by around 30 pp to 102% and 59% 
(Chart 4). Moreover, the sector’s aggregate balance sheet has 
been significantly restructured during the lengthy expansion and 
mortgage debt is now concentrated in those groups of households 
with less credit risk (Chart  8). Finally, the financial regulation 
BOX 3THE SLOWDOWN IN THE US HOUSING MARKET 
1  See Leamer, E., 2007. “Housing is the business cycle,” Proceedings - 
Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, pages 149-233.
2  As indicated in the University of Michigan house buying conditions 
index.
3  American Bankers Association, “24th Annual ABA Residential Real 
Estate Survey Report”, March 2017.
4  Federal Reserve, “Consumer & Community Context”, January 2019.
5  See the latest editions of the Federal Reserve’s Beige Book.
6  See Brookings Institution, “The Goldilocks problem of housing supply: 
too little, too much, or just right?”.
7  See Urban Land Institute and PWC, “Emerging Trends in Real Estate 
2019”.
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BOX 3 THE SLOWDOWN IN THE US HOUSING MARKET  (cont’d)
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changes introduced after the crisis have tightened the requirements 
on mortgage loan collateral and on the financial derivatives created 
from such mortgages. That has mitigated the risks to national and 
global financial stability of a correction in the US housing sector.8
In sum, the housing market is significant for the US economy as a 
whole. Its possible implications for financial stability, along with 
the habitual difficulty of anticipating potentially sharp changes in 
the real estate cycle, warrant the growing attention and ongoing 
monitoring of conditions in this market by analysts and official 
institutions. 
BOX 3 THE SLOWDOWN IN THE US HOUSING MARKET  (cont’d)
8  Federal Reserve, “Financial Stability Report”, November 2018.
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On 13 December, the ECB Governing Council announced the end 
of net asset purchases at the close of 2018 and re-emphasised its 
reinvestment policy for instruments acquired under its asset 
purchase programme (APP). Specifically, the Council stated it 
envisages fully reinvesting the principal payments from maturing 
securities “for an extended period of time past the date when it 
starts raising the key ECB interest rates”. At the same meeting, the 
Council maintained its expectations that these rates would hold at 
their current levels “at least through the summer of 2019”, 
lengthening this term to “at least through the end of 2019” at its 
latest meeting on 7 March.1
Against this background it is worth analysing first, how market 
expectations about the future course of the ECB benchmark 
interest rate have recently behaved; and further, how the future 
path of rates currently expected by the markets compares with 
that observed in past episodes in which the ECB and the US 
Federal Reserve initiated cycles of interest rate rises. 
As Chart 1 shows, market expectations about the future course of 
the ECB’s benchmark interest rate (the deposit facility rate), 
proxied by the EONIA2 instantaneous forward curve, have been 
revised downwards notably in recent months. In October 2018 the 
markets were discounting 10 bp increases in interest rates in the 
following 12 months (see green curve in Chart 1), thereby pencilling 
in the first rise for October this year. However, they now envisage 
BOX 4MARKET EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE EURO AREA BENCHMARK INTEREST RATE
1  See: Monetary policy decisions, ECB press releases of 13 December 
2018 and of 7 March 2019. At its meeting on 7 March, the Governing 
Council also agreed on a new series of quarterly targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations (TLTRO-III).
2  EONIA (Euro Overnight Index Average) is the average overnight interbank 
interest rate in the euro area. Since 2009, the behaviour of the EONIA 
index has been very similar to that of the ECB’s deposit facility rate, 
which is currently the benchmark rate for euro area monetary policy. 
Also, it should be borne in mind that forward rates, especially for longer-
dated horizons, may incorporate risk premia in addition to future 
expectations about interest rates.
SOURCES: ECB, Federal Reserve and Datastream.
NOTE: The data on expected rates are obtained calculating the instantaneous forward curve based on OIS (overnight index swaps). The actual interest rate is the
EONIA index for the euro area and the Fed Funds Rate for the United States.
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this rise taking place within 19 months (see blue curve in Chart 1), 
which means a delay until October 2020 (assuming that this first 
rise were to be one of 10 bp). Essentially behind this change has 
been the worsening outlook for global growth observed in late 
2018, most markedly so for the euro area. But another factor has 
been the recent change in the minimum time horizon over which 
the ECB Governing Council expects to maintain its policy interest 
rates at current levels, announced on 7 March this year along with 
a downward revision of the growth and inflation projections for the 
euro area in the coming years. Following these announcements, 
the date foreseen by the markets for the first rise in rates was set 
back by three months compared with what the markets had 
anticipated just before learning of the measures adopted at the 
last ECB Governing Council (see the red and blue curves in 
Chart 1). 
Beyond the delay in the start of the cycle of euro area policy 
interest rate rises, Chart 1 shows how market expectations about 
the intensity of any future process of rises in these interest rates 
may have been considerably modified in recent months. In 
particular, if in early October 2018 the EONIA instantaneous 
forward curve anticipated that the euro area benchmark interest 
rate would turn positive as from August 2020 (22 months later), the 
flattening of this curve in the recent period indicates that the 
market foresees interest rates not moving into positive territory 
before 2022 (within 38 months).
The high gradualism the markets expect of the future path of euro 
area interest rate rises is in contrast to the behaviour of these rates 
in the past two episodes in which the ECB initiated cycles of interest 
rate rises (1999 and 2005)3. It also runs counter to the expectations 
the markets had about future rises at the time of the first increase in 
rates in these episodes. Currently, the EONIA instantaneous forward 
curve is discounting a 34 bp increase in the euro area benchmark 
rate in the two years following the first rise (October 2020) (see the 
blue line in Charts 2 and 3). That is below the 158 bp and 75 bp 
increases the markets were anticipating at the time of the first rise in 
rates in the 1999 and 2005 tightening episodes, respectively (see the 
unbroken lines in red in Charts 2 and 3), and less than the respective 
rises of 85 bp and 141 bp actually observed (see the broken lines in 
red in Charts 2 and 34).
Current euro area policy interest rate expectations are also in 
contrast to the intensity of the ongoing normalisation in the United 
States since the Federal Reserve raised its policy rates for the first 
time in this cycle in December 2015. Two years after this first rise, 
US benchmark rates rose by 126 bp, an increase very close to that 
expected by the markets in December 2015 (96 bp), but far above 
the current expectations in the euro area (see Chart 4). Yet in recent 
months the mounting signs of moderation in the US economy’s 
growth rate has prompted the Federal Reserve to revise the path of 
interest rate normalisation.5 Indeed, at present, the markets expect 
US policy rates to stand in the short and medium term below the 
levels they anticipated only a few months back. 
In conclusion, the recent macroeconomic downturn and the 
announcement of the extension of the minimum time horizon over 
which the ECB expects to maintain its policy interest rates at current 
levels has prompted the markets to significantly put back the envisaged 
date of the start of interest rate rises in the euro area. Moreover, the 
markets currently anticipate that, following that first rise, the path of 
subsequent increases will be very gradual, both in historical terms and 
compared with movements in the United States from 2015 to late 
2018. The downward revision in recent months in interest rate 
expectations shows that the ECB’s forward guidance policy has been 
effective in steering financial market expectations, by making the future 
path of interest rates conditional upon the economic situation and the 
inflation outlook. This forward guidance should contribute to mitigating 
the scale of the slowdown in activity insofar as it promotes, through the 
adjustment of market expectations, easier financial conditions. 
BOX 4 MARKET EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE EURO AREA BENCHMARK INTEREST RATE (cont’d)
3  Moreover, the ECB increased its benchmark interest rate on two 
occasions in 2011, in March and in July. That said, this cycle of rises was 
interrupted in November that same year when the decision was taken to 
cut the interest rate once more.
4  In the charts, the EONIA instantaneous forward curve is normalised so 
that it commences with an interest rate equal to zero at three different 
points in time: the present (showing the curve 19 months ahead) and at 
the start of the ECB monetary policy tightening periods in 1999 and 
2005. Significantly, both in 1999 and in 2005, the euro area benchmark 
interest rates corresponded to those on the main refinancing operations 
(MRO), the behaviour of which was in turn very similar to the EONIA.
5  At the press conference following the latest FOMC meeting in late 
January, at which it was decided to hold policy rates unchanged, the Fed 
chairman Jerome Powell warned of the need to be patient regarding 
changes in interest rate policy. This message remains valid, since the 
Fed chairman suggested in an interview on Sunday, 10 March, that he 
did not feel any hurry to change the current interest rate policy.
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On 21 February 2019, the Congress of Deputies approved the Law 
regulating real estate credit agreements (the Law), which is due to 
be published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado (Official State 
Gazette) in the next few days and to come into force three months 
thereafter. The Law, which will then apply to new mortgage 
agreements and, in certain specific cases, to outstanding 
agreements, transposes Directive 2014/17/EU1 into Spanish law. 
This directive regulates customer protection, transparency and 
conduct in relation to credit agreements for the acquisition of 
residential real estate. The Law also contains other provisions not 
specifically envisaged in the directive, which further strengthen 
borrower protection in certain areas. This box summarises the 
main features of this law and analyses its possible effects on the 
mortgage market.
The Law introduces highly detailed rules for the pre-contractual 
stage, requiring lenders to provide borrowers with information on the 
content of agreements through the European Standardised 
Information Sheet, which will be considered to be a binding offer, and 
a standardised warning sheet including information on the most 
important clauses and features of the agreement. At the same time, 
notaries are assigned a more important role, being required to ensure 
that customers have been provided with all the necessary information 
within the periods laid down and to provide advice on the content of 
the agreement. The content of the notarised deed will be considered 
evidence of such advice and of the borrower’s understanding and 
acceptance of the content of the documents delivered, for the 
purposes of substantive compliance with the principle of transparency. 
The property registrar, meanwhile, will refuse to register those clauses 
of agreements that are contrary to legal provisions or that have been 
declared null and void by the Supreme Court.
Also, a number of rules are introduced on the conduct and internal 
organisation of lending institutions, requiring the solvency of the 
borrower to be assessed before and during the life of the loan, the 
remuneration of the lender’s staff not to be linked to the volume of 
credit transactions (to avoid adverse incentives) and a general ban 
on tying practices. Moreover, unlike at present, when most of the 
expenses related to the loan agreement tend to be borne by the 
borrower, after the entry into force of the Law, the agency, notary 
and registration fees will be payable by the lender, the borrower 
bearing only the appraisal fees and the cost of any copies 
requested of notarised documents.2
The regulations currently in force limit only the maximum fees for 
early repayment (i.e. when the customer repays all or part of the 
outstanding debt early) in the case of variable rate agreements. As 
seen in Table 1, the Law reduces these maximum fees from 0.5% 
or 0.25% of the repaid principal, according to whether the 
repayment takes place during the first five years of the loan or 
thereafter, to 0.25% during the first three years (or alternatively 
0.15% during the first five years, depending on what the parties 
BOX 5THE LAW REGULATING REAL ESTATE CREDIT AGREEMENTS
1  Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential 
immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU 
and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
2  Stamp tax is also payable by the lender, following the entry into force of 
Royal Decree Law 17/2018.
Life of the loan 
(years)
Current regulations
(%)
Maximum fees for:
05.03-0etar dexif ot elbairav morf egnahC
3-5 0.50
Over 5 0.25
)b(01-0snaol etar tseretni dexif no tnemyaper ylraE
Over 10 (b)
3 years (c)
(%)
5 years (c)
(%)
51.052.005.03-0snaol etar tseretni elbairav no tnemyaper ylraE
3-5 0.50 0.00 0.15
Over 5 0.25 0.00 0.00
1.50
New law (a)
(%)
0.15
0.00
2.00
0.00
Table 1
SOURCE: Law regulating real estate credit agreements.
a Fees may not exceed the financial loss caused to the lender.
b The fees applied shall be those agreed by the two parties. In the absence of an agreement, the fees shall be the amount of the financial loss to the lender.
c Term agreed for charging of fees.
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BOX 5 THE LAW REGULATING REAL ESTATE CREDIT AGREEMENTS (cont’d)
agreed) and 0% thereafter. The Law also introduces maximum 
limits for early repayment fees in the case of fixed rate loans (2% 
of the repaid principal during the first 10 years of the loan, and 
1.5% thereafter).3 The higher fees in the case of fixed rate loans 
are justified by the financial loss lenders may incur in the event of 
early repayment. This loss arises when the market interest rate 
falls below the mortgage rate, since the interest that the lender 
would have received during the residual life of the loan will be 
greater than the market return available on similar assets when the 
repaid funds are reinvested. As seen in Chart 1, this loss basically 
depends on the residual maturity of the mortgage, the (positive) 
differential between the mortgage rate and the market interest rate 
and, albeit to a lesser extent, the level of market returns.4 This 
chart also shows that the maximum limits established by the new 
regulations (the dotted lines) would in some cases not fully cover 
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a Average rates on new lending in December 2018 for each country.
b Period for which the fixed rate at origination is maintained.
INTERVAL BETWEEN 25th AND 75th.
3  In any event, the amount of fees may not exceed, either in the case of 
fixed rate loans or in that of variable rate loans, the financial loss caused 
to the lender. 
4  Chart 1 shows the present value of future losses for the institution, 
obtained using a discount factor that depends on the market interest 
rate. The higher the market interest rate the more future losses are 
discounted and thus the lower their present value.
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the financial loss suffered by the lender in the case of fixed rate 
loans.
The Law also regulates acceleration, namely the right of the lender 
to terminate the agreement in the event that the borrower has 
failed to pay a certain number of loan instalments, as a prior step 
to realising the collateral. Specifically, it establishes that in order 
for the lender to be able to exercise this right during the first half of 
the life of the loan the unpaid instalments must exceed 3% of the 
loan principal or 12 monthly instalments or, during the second half 
of the loan, 7% of principal or 15 instalments. Further, the lender 
must have requested the borrower to pay the outstanding amount, 
while granting the latter a period of at least one month in which to 
do so. These provisions will not only apply to new agreements but 
also to existing mortgages with acceleration clauses, unless the 
debtor alleges that the clause is more favourable to it or that the 
right to terminate arose before the entry into force of the Law. As 
seen in Chart 2 (for the first half of the life of the loan) and Chart 3 
(for the second half), the number of unpaid instalments necessary 
to reach 3% or 7%, respectively, of the loan principal, which gives 
the lender the right to terminate, depends on the interest rate, the 
residual maturity of the mortgage and the amount of the loan 
already repaid. In most cases, this number of monthly instalments 
is clearly more than three (the dotted line in the charts), the number 
usually specified in mortgage clauses as the requirement for 
acceleration.5 As a result, the Law will generally lengthen the time 
taken to recover past-due amounts in the case of non-performing 
loans.
Lastly, the law introduces incentives for the subrogation (change 
of institution) and novation (change in the terms and conditions of 
the mortgage with the same institution) of loans when a variable 
rate mortgage is converted into a fixed rate one (see Table 1). 
Specifically, maximum fees are established that are lower than 
those generally charged for early repayment of variable rate loans: 
0.15%, during the first three years (as opposed to 0.25% when the 
fees are set for a period of three years) and 0%, subsequently (as 
opposed to 0.15% between the third and fifth years when the fees 
are set for a period of five years). These limits are also lower than 
those currently in force (0.5% during the first five years and 0.25% 
thereafter). These reforms will apply to both new and existing 
loans.
The approval and forthcoming entry into force of the new Law may 
have various effects on the mortgage market. First, the introduction 
of binding clauses (as in the case of acceleration and early 
repayment), along with the increase in information available to 
customers during the pre-contractual stage, can be expected to 
contribute to reducing legal uncertainty and the currently high 
level of litigiousness in this market, which should lead to more 
lending and an improvement in the functioning of the mortgage 
segment.
Moreover, the greater transparency and standardisation of the 
information available on agreements and the lowered transaction 
costs associated with a change in lender may raise the competition 
from both domestic and European operators. As regards the latter, 
it should be noted that one of the objectives of the directive was to 
increase the integration of European mortgage markets. In any 
event, given that notable cross-country differences still persist 
between the law applicable in this area and, moreover, as seen in 
Chart 4, Spain is not among the countries with the highest levels 
of interest rates in most segments,6 the effects on the cost of 
borrowing associated with greater integration of these markets at 
the European level can be expected to be moderate.
At the same time, the increase in the mortgage costs borne by 
lenders and, in particular, the maximum limits on early repayment 
fees in the case of fixed rate agreements may lead to a certain 
increase in the rates charged on new loans, especially in the case 
of those applied to the latter type of agreement.
The delay in the recovery of past-due debt for lenders may result 
in a certain tightening of lending conditions, especially those for 
debtors with a higher risk profile. Also, the stricter borrower 
solvency assessment requirements may exacerbate these latter 
effects, while being conducive to an improvement in the quality of 
institutions’ loan portfolios. In any case, the final impact of the Law 
on mortgage financing conditions will also depend on the effects 
in the opposite direction associated with the possible increase in 
competition and the reduction in legal uncertainty.
Finally, the greater ease with which variable rate loans can be 
converted into fixed rate ones may encourage a shift in the stock 
of debt towards fixed rate agreements, reducing the high current 
weight of variable rate mortgages.7 This would lead to a transfer of 
interest rate risk from debtors to creditors, who are in principle in 
a better position to manage such risk. However, the extent of this 
effect will depend on debtors’ risk/cost preferences, i.e. the extent 
to which, in order to secure a fixed rate of interest over the life of 
the loan, they are prepared to incur a higher expected cost, 
reflecting an interest-rate risk premium and a premium associated 
with the possibility of early repayment.
BOX 5 THE LAW REGULATING REAL ESTATE CREDIT AGREEMENTS (cont’d)
5  Current legislation does not regulate acceleration, but most outstanding 
agreements include acceleration clauses that generally give the lender 
the right to terminate when three instalments remain unpaid. 
6  As at the reference date of the chart, the percentages of the amount of 
new transactions in Spain by maturity were: 35% up to one year, 32% 
between one and 10 years and 33% over 10 years. 
7  Fixed rate transactions account for only around 10% of the total stock of 
loans, although in recent years there has been an increase in this type of 
loan in new lending.
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In the current expansionary phase the Spanish economy has shown 
robust job growth, the current level of which increased in 2018 for 
the fifth year running. This dynamic is allowing a notable part of the 
unemployment generated during the crisis to be absorbed.1 The 
persistence of a sufficiently long period of net job creation allows us 
to analyse gross job creation and destruction and thus examine 
possible changes in them compared with the crisis period and 
particularly with the latter years of the previous expansion. This box 
addresses this question through a descriptive analysis of employment 
inflow and outflow rates using flow information from the Spanish 
Labour Force Survey (LFS),2 paying particular attention to the 
breakdown by type of contract (temporary or permanent).
Chart 1 shows, along with the year-on-year change in GDP, the job 
creation rate proxied by the ratio of total employment inflows in a 
quarter to the total unemployed and economically inactive population 
in the previous quarter (i.e. the probability that a person who is not 
working will become employed in the following three months). As can 
be seen, after touching bottom in 2013 at around 5.8%, the job creation 
rate exhibited a rising trend until mid-2017, holding relatively steady 
since then at around 6.5%. True, this percentage is lower than before 
the crisis, when it exceeded 8%; but it should be kept in mind that this 
is basically because the unemployed and economically inactive 
population (i.e. the denominator of the ratio) is larger at present, while 
the number of jobs created is, in gross terms, similar to that in the years 
before the recession.3 Indeed, the pace of job creation would even be 
somewhat higher in the current recovery if it were taken into account 
that GDP growth, which drives job creation, is currently somewhat 
lower than in the two years preceding the onset of the crisis.
As regards the flows from employment to unemployment, the 
probability of becoming unemployed, as measured by the ratio of 
the people who lose their job in a quarter to the total employed in 
the previous quarter, has fluctuated more sharply in the recent 
period. Specifically, after increasing markedly at the height of the 
recession, this variable trended downwards from 2013, to stand at 
3.3% at end-2018 (see Chart 2). However, although this rate is the 
lowest in the last 10 years, it is still nearly 1 pp higher than in the 
two-year period from 2006 to 2007. Also, in step with the definition 
of the job creation rate described above, if the outflows from 
employment were to take into account a transition to non-
employment status which included not only unemployment but 
also inactivity, the job destruction rate would currently be similar to 
that in the pre-crisis period (see Chart 3).
Analysis of employment inflows by type of contract shows that the 
proportion of new labour market entrants under a temporary 
contract increased between 2009 and 2015, in line with the greater 
incentives firms have to opt for this type of contract in situations of 
high uncertainty (see Chart 4). This trend was, moreover, 
accompanied by a significant decrease in conversions of 
temporary workers into permanent ones (see Chart 5). 
Subsequently, despite the economic recovery having become 
more firmly entrenched, the proportion of temporary workers in 
employment inflows showed no signs of moderating, remaining 
steady at a slightly higher level than in 2006. What was observed, 
by contrast, was a rise in the percentage of temporary jobs being 
converted into permanent ones from 2017 onwards. Yet this 
percentage stood at 8% at end-2018, a level clearly lower than 
that before the crisis, when it reached values near 13%.4 The 
downward stickiness of the proportion of temporary jobs in 
employment inflows is apparent, to a greater or lesser extent, in all 
of the five main economic sectors analysed,5 although it is 
somewhat more marked in construction than in the others. 
Moreover, in all economic sectors the rate of conversion of 
temporary workers into permanent ones was lower in 2018 than in 
2006, particularly in private-sector services and industry. In 
construction it rose last year, approaching the level of 2006.
Temporary workers are also those hit hardest by job destruction. 
Chart 6 shows that the ratio of temporary employees to wage-
earners who became unemployed was lower during the crisis than 
at the end of the previous upturn. This phenomenon is consistent 
with the increase in probability of dismissal which, regardless of 
contract type, can be expected at the height of a recession. At the 
beginning of the current expansion, this percentage again grew, as 
is customary in cyclical upturns, until it steadied in 2016. Since 
then it has remained at a level similar to that of 2006, doing so 
across-the-board in all economic sectors.
In conclusion, the current expansion has not wrought major 
changes in job creation and destruction with respect to those 
seen in 2006-2007, i.e. at the end of the previous upturn, after 
taking into account the GDP growth rate and the levels of the 
employed, unemployed and economically inactive populations in 
both periods. Both processes continue to be underpinned 
basically by temporary employment. Meanwhile, the creation of 
permanent jobs, and particularly temporary-to-permanent 
conversions, which were low in the previous expansion, seem to 
have decreased even more in the latest crisis and subsequent 
recovery, although these conversions have risen in the last two 
years. Thus, despite extensive regulatory changes throughout the 
period in question, the Spanish labour market continues to feature 
excess job temporariness and churn. This has an adverse impact 
not only on productivity but also on the inequality of employment 
income. It may thus be advisable for permanent contracts to be 
made more attractive, without that being to the detriment of job 
creation.
BOX 6JOB CREATION AND DESTRUCTION FLOWS BY TYPE OF CONTRACT DURING THE RECOVERY 
1  In 2018, employment grew by 2.7%, similar to the rate in the previous 
two years. See the Nota Económica entitled “La evolución del empleo y 
del paro en 2018, según la Encuesta de Población Activa”, Banco de 
España (only in Spanish). 
2  All the flows represented were calculated at the Banco de España from 
INE microdata and are expressed as four-quarter moving averages to 
eliminate seasonal movements, which are extremely pronounced.
3  Thus the job creation rate in the current recovery would be similar to that 
of the pre-crisis years if, alternatively, it were calculated as the flow of 
new employment divided by the stock of employment in the previous 
year, given that this latter variable now stands at a level similar to that of 
2006-2007 (see Chart 3).
4  Up to mid-2006, temporary-to-permanent conversions were moreover 
favoured by the widespread tax rebates they enjoyed, which were 
eliminated in the labour market reform approved in mid-2006. 
Subsequently some rebates for certain types of contracts remained in 
force, such as those for apprenticeships, although they made up a scant 
share of the total jobs created.
5  Agriculture, industry, construction, public services and private services.
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BOX 6 JOB CREATION AND DESTRUCTION FLOWS BY TYPE OF CONTRACT DURING THE RECOVERY  (cont’d)
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Economic activity in the euro area lost momentum in 2018. It was 
chiefly affected by the worse performance of global demand and, 
in some countries, by transitory factors that have borne down on 
growth (see Chart 1). External factors have also contributed 
adversely to developments in the Spanish economy; but in Spain, 
growth rates have held stable, posting high figures (of around 
0.6%-0.7% quarter on quarter) clearly up on those of the euro area 
as a whole. The greater resilience of the Spanish economy 
continues to be apparent in the latest economic indicators 
published, referring both to end-2018 and to 2019 Q1. In this 
connection, this box evaluates and quantifies the differences in 
recent developments in the euro area and Spanish economies. 
Such developments might, in Spain’s case, be a reflection of 
idiosyncratic elements, which would offset the influence of the 
negative factors affecting both areas, and which would explain the 
greater slowdown in the euro area. 
Very-short-term developments in economic activity can be 
evaluated with the help of real-time forecasting models1, such as 
the dynamic factor models the Banco de España has both for our 
economy and for that of the euro area, known as Spain-STING and 
Euro-STING, respectively. These two models are equivalent in 
methodological terms, although they are designed for real-time 
forecasting for each particular economy, through the selection of 
specific conjunctural indicators. These tools have proven very 
useful for processing the signals obtained from the flow of a 
relatively broad set of indicators and for combining them as an 
overview of the course of GDP growth in the current quarter. With 
each new release of data on a specific indicator, these models 
provide for a re-evaluation of the state of the economy, measured 
through the change in the GDP growth projection in the current 
quarter.
The comparison of the path of the projections obtained with 
Spain-STING and Euro-STING allows for a comparative 
assessment of the impact of the latest information on economic 
activity in both economies. It should be stressed that, in interpreting 
the results of these models, greater significance should be given 
to the changes in the projections over time than to the point 
estimates themselves; the latter should not generally be interpreted 
as the best available projection of GDP growth. Indeed, at the 
Banco de España and among most national and international 
economic analysts, the usual practice is for the figures provided 
by the specific models to be complemented, for the formulation of 
the best projection, by figures from other quantitative tools, and by 
additional information not from the models. 
A further aspect to bear in mind is that these models generate 
forecasts for each of the indicators they incorporate; therefore, the 
GDP growth forecast will only be revised if the new information 
differs from that expected by the model. In this way, it is the 
positive (negative) surprises in the data that positively (negatively) 
impact the GDP projection. By way of example, positive growth in 
industrial production will not necessarily translate into an upward 
revision in the GDP forecast; it will do so only if such growth were 
higher than that expected by the model. 
Table 1 shows the set of indicators published since the start of 
this year that each of these two models uses. Also given are the 
date of publication and the differential impact that the 
incorporation of the indicators has given rise to in the GDP 
BOX 7A COMPARISON OF RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN AND IN THE EURO AREA
1  See M. Camacho and G. Pérez Quirós (2010), “Introducing the euro-
sting: Short-term indicator of euro area growth”, Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 25(4), pp. 663-694, M. Camacho and G. Pérez Quirós 
(2011), “Spain-Sting: Spain Short-Term Indicator of Growth”, Manchester 
School, 79(1), pp. 594-616 and A. Arancibia Pareja, A. Gómez Loscos, 
M. de Luis López and G. Pérez Quirós (2017), A short-term forecasting 
model for the Spanish economy: GDP and its demand components, 
Documento Ocasional 1801, Banco de España.
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
2  SPAIN
%
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
1  EURO AREA
%
Chart 1
YEAR-ON-YEAR GDP GROWTH AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROWTH
SOURCE: Eurostat.
NATIONAL DEMAND EXTERNAL DEMAND YEAR-ON-YEAR RATE OF GDP
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 1/2019 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
BOX 7A COMPARISON OF RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN AND IN THE EURO AREA (cont’d)
forecast in 2019 Q1 for the euro area as a whole and for Spain, 
respectively. One initial aspect to highlight is that there is no 
observable uniform pattern regarding the direction in which the 
new information has affected the growth forecasts for each 
economy, since the number of downward revisions has been 
similar to that of upward revisions. However, when the magnitude 
of the impacts of the revisions as a whole is quantified, clear 
differences can be seen between both economies. In this respect, 
Chart 2 shows directly how the new information received since 1 
January has led to a downward revision of the Euro-STING 
forecasts for quarter-on-quarter GDP growth in the euro area in 
Q1, while the aggregate effect has been positive in the case of the 
Indicator Release date
Reference
period
Impact 
on GDP
Indicator Release date
Reference
period
Impact 
on GDP
Composite PMI 04/01/2019 December = Social Security registrations 03/01/2019 December +
Retail sales 07/01/2019 November + Electricity consumption in industry 04/01/2019 December -
-rebmeceD9102/10/40IMP etisopmoC=rebmeceD9102/10/80ISE
Industrial production 14/01/2019 November - ESI excluding consumers 08/01/2019 December -
Employment (revision) 14/01/2019 2018 Q3 = Non-energy Industrial Production Index 11/01/2019 November -
Final GDP 14/01/2019 2018 Q3 =
Construction materials Industrial 
Production Index
11/01/2019 November =
-rebmevoN9102/10/51smrif egral fo selaS-rebmevoN9102/10/51stropxE
New industrial orders 22/01/2019 November + Real imports (goods) 22/01/2019 November =
Composite PMI
flash estimate 24/01/2019 January + Real exports (goods) 22/01/2019 November =
-yraunaJ9102/10/03sremusnoc gnidulcxe ISE+yraunaJ9102/10/03ISE
-rebmeceD9102/10/13tiderC=4Q 81029102/10/13flash estimate 
PDG yranimilerP
Retail sales 05/02/2019 December - GDP flash estimate 2018 Q4 31/01/2019 2018 Q4 +
Composite PMI 05/02/2019 January = Electricity consumption in industry 01/02/2019 January +
Industrial production 13/02/2019 December - Social Security registrations 04/02/2019 January -
+yraunaJ9102/20/50IMP etisopmoC-4Q 81029102/20/41etamitse hsalf PDG
Employment 14/02/2019 2018 Q4 + Non-energy Industrial Production Index 07/02/2019 December -
Exports 15/02/2019 December =
Construction materials Industrial 
Production Index
07/02/2019 December +
Composite PMI
flash estimates +rebmeceD9102/20/11smrif egral fo selaS+yraurbeF9102/20/12
New industrial orders 22/02/2019 December - Real imports (goods) 21/02/2019 December =
=rebmeceD9102/20/12)sdoog( stropxe laeR+yraurbeF9102/20/72ISE
Composite PMI 05/03/2019 February = ESI excluding consumers 27/02/2019 February =
+yraunaJ9102/20/82tiderC+
+
yraunaJ9102/30/50selas liateR
GDP components 07/03/2019 2018 Q4 + Electricity consumption in industry 01/03/2019 February -
Employment (revision) 07/03/2019 2018 Q4 = Social Security registrations 04/03/2019 February -
=yraurbeF9102/30/50IMP etisopmoCrebmeceD9102/30/31noitcudorp lairtsudnI
Non-energy Industrial Production Index 08/03/2019 January +
Construction materials Industrial 
Production Index
08/03/2019 January =
+yraunaJ9102/30/21smrif egral fo selaS
STING-niapSSTING-oruE
Table 1
IMPACT OF THE LATEST INDICATORS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN AND IN THE EURO AREA
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Spanish economy. In particular, from 1 January to 13 March, the 
GDP growth projection has fallen by approximately 0.1 pp for the 
euro area, while it has been revised upwards by 0.1 pp in Spain’s 
case. 
In conclusion, the set of conjunctural indicators included in the 
models and published in recent months has affected the growth 
forecast for activity in Spain compared with that for the euro area 
in a differentiated fashion. The divergence between both areas 
might be due to the greater impact of idiosyncratic elements in the 
Spanish economy exerting a positive effect on short-term activity. 
In any event, it should be qualified that the statistical information 
available at the cut-off date for this report for 2019 Q1 refers 
almost exclusively to the first half of the quarter, and to a limited 
set of indicators. As a result, it cannot be ruled out that elements 
common to the rest of the euro area may be feeding through, or 
may ultimately do so with greater intensity, if they persist over 
time, to the Spanish economy. 
BOX 7 A COMPARISON OF RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN AND IN THE EURO AREA (cont’d)
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FORECAST FOR THE QUARTER-ON-QUARTER GDP RATE IN 2019 Q1. CHANGE FROM 1 JANUARY TO 13 MARCH 2019
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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2 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
Recovery of financial asset prices in international markets, against a backdrop of more 
accommodative monetary policies
International financial markets have performed very favourably since the beginning 
of the year, in contrast with the turmoil experienced at the end of 2018. Thus, in both 
advanced and emerging economies the stock market indices started 2019 with notable 
increases, against a background of widespread drops in volatility and greater appetite for 
risk assets (see Chart 2). 
These market dynamics were conditioned by the change in the global monetary 
policy stance and by greater optimism regarding the possibility of a trade agreement 
between the United States and China. The measures implemented by the Chinese 
authorities to counteract the slowdown of the economy and certain positive surprises in 
US corporate earnings also contributed to this market recovery. These factors weighed 
more on investor sentiment than the recent downward revision of projected world growth, 
which was particularly pronounced in the euro area. 
In the United States, the Federal Reserve raised its benchmark interest rate at its 
December meeting, but its communication policy later adopted a clearly 
accommodative stance. This change in trend was confirmed following the monetary 
policy meeting of January in which the Fed stated that it would be “patient” with regard to 
future interest rate adjustments, surprising the market by opening the door to a possible 
slowing in the pace of its balance sheet reduction. 
In the euro area, the ECB also reinforced the accommodative stance of its monetary 
policy. At its March meeting, the ECB indicated (see Chapter 3.2) that it expects its policy 
interest rates to remain at the current levels at least until the end of 2019. This is a longer 
term than stated previously (at least through the summer of 2019). The Governing Council 
of the ECB also announced a new series of quarterly targeted longer-term refinancing 
operations (TLTRO-III) with the aim of maintaining favourable financing conditions and a 
fluid transmission of monetary policy.
These monetary policy decisions have substantially impacted market expectations 
about future interest rate developments. Thus, US markets do not currently anticipate 
any rise in the policy interest rates during 2019 and even consider the possibility of a fall 
in 2020. Meanwhile, market expectations about the date of the first rise in the euro area 
benchmark interest rates were delayed until October 2020 (see Box 4). These changes 
regarding the future path of interest rates have pushed long-term sovereign bond yields 
downward (especially in the euro area) and have helped drive risk asset valuations through 
the discount rate. 
Under this scenario, risk premia have trended downwards. Since the beginning of the 
year, stock market, term or credit risk compensation has fallen across the board. In fixed 
income, the compression of sovereign spreads in emerging economies stands out, while 
the fall in corporate debt risk premia in advanced economies was not sufficient to offset 
the increases recorded at end-2018. 
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There were no major fluctuations in foreign exchange markets in the early months of 
2019. The appreciation of the pound sterling and the depreciation of the Japanese yen are 
noteworthy. As in the last few months, the sterling pound exchange rate in the most recent 
period continued to be marked by swings in market expectations about how and when the 
United Kingdom will exit the European Union. The recent depreciation of the yen, a 
currency traditionally used as a safe-haven asset and in carry trade transactions, should 
be put into perspective considering the strong appreciation recorded at the end of 2018, 
against a background of strong risk-aversion in the markets. Finally, the euro exchange 
rate has shown a slight trend towards depreciation, but has not been significantly affected 
by monetary policy announcements.
Despite favourable market performance since the beginning of the year, important 
downside risks persist. In particular, the rebound experienced by stock market prices in 
recent months has once again driven valuations in this market to historically very 
demanding levels, especially in certain geographical areas. Also, in a context where credit 
risk premia remain relatively contained, while public and private indebtedness in certain 
regions remain at very high levels, a stronger or persistent slowing of global growth could 
give rise to a sharp readjustment of valuations, with potentially highly disruptive effects 
both for financial markets and for the macroeconomic environment.
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3 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY
Global activity and trade continue to slow, though with cross-regional differences
In 2018 Q4, global activity continued on its slowing path. But there were cross-
regional differences. Growth was more robust in the United States and emerging Asia 
than in other regions, although both the US and the Chinese economies posted a 
slowdown. Global GDP thus grew 3.7% in 2018 as a whole, 0.1 pp down on 2017 and 
below expectations at the start of the year. The high-frequency indicators point to the 
continuation of the slowdown in the global economy at the onset of 2019 (see Chart 3.1). 
Global trade contracted in Q4 by 0.9% quarter-on-quarter (q-o-q), after growing by 1.3% 
q-o-q in the previous quarter. The contraction was especially sharp in the Asian economies, 
once the anticipation effect prior to the entry into force in September of higher US tariffs 
on Chinese products waned (see Chart 3.2). Further, sluggish Chinese domestic demand 
also contributed to the fall in trade. The leading indicators of world trade, such as export 
orders, augur the continued weakness of trade in goods and services in 2019 Q1. 
On the commodities markets, Brent oil prices have risen by over 17% since mid-
December to their current level of around $67. This rise has been essentially due to 
agreed production cuts by OPEC and other producers, and to the impact of US sanctions 
on Venezuela and Iran on supply. Metal prices have also risen. 
Activity in the advanced economies prompted a downward surprise and US growth 
slowed, leading the Federal Reserve to adopt a cautious stance 
US GDP growth in Q4 was 2.6% in annualised quarterly terms, following a rate of 3.4% in 
Q3. This was due to the slowdown in private consumption, and despite investment rising 
somewhat (see Chart 4.1). In the United Kingdom, GDP growth fell to 0.2% q-o-q against 
the background of high uncertainty surrounding Brexit, reflected in a heavy decline in 
investment. In Japan, GDP grew 0.3% q-o-q, after a decline of 0.7% in Q3, although the 
external sector maintained a negative contribution. Inflation rates continued on a declining 
trend (see Chart 4.2), reflecting the course of the energy component. Core inflation rates, 
meantime, held stable despite wage growth and the favourable juncture labour markets 
are at (see Chart 4.3). Given the doubts over global growth, the tensions on financial 
markets and scant inflationary pressures, central banks have adopted a more cautious 
stance (see Chart 4.4). The Federal Reserve departed from its monetary policy normalisation 
path, adopting a stance that was more neutral and dependent on economic developments. 
It also signalled that its balance sheet reduction would conclude in the second half of 
2019. The Bank of Japan revised its inflation outlook downwards and kept its monetary 
policy measures unchanged. The Bank of England, for its part, cut its GDP growth forecast 
and stands ready to react to Brexit-related events. In this connection, a currency swap 
arrangement has been activated between the Bank of England and the ECB for the lending 
of euro and pound sterling to banks, in support of market workings.  
Emerging financial markets trended favourably against a backdrop of more 
accommodative monetary policies, following the Federal Reserve’s action and China’s 
stimulus policies
In the emerging economies, the financial markets behaved favourably. As described 
in section 2, this was due to the more accommodative monetary policy outlook in the 
3.1  The external setting 
of the euro area
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United States, the new stimulus measures in China and greater optimism over a possible 
China/US trade deal (see Charts 5.1 to 5.3). Stock market indices trended positively 
(especially in Asia, led by China), exchange rates generally held fairly stable, there were net 
capital inflows and fixed-income issuances rose in January and February. Notable 
exceptions were Argentina and Turkey. In the former, the markets were affected by high 
inflation figures and the central bank’s regulatory changes. In the latter, the government’s 
new interventionist measures were a factor. Mexico was also a case in point. The peso 
depreciated following the downgrading of the state-owned oil company PEMEX to below 
investment grade. 
Activity in the emerging economies was also generally less dynamic. Growth in China 
eased in Q4 from 6.5% to 6.4% year-on-year. The result was the outcome of the escalating 
trade war with the United States, and of the tightening of the financial deleveraging policies 
set in place in 2018 (see Chart 6.1). But faced with the risks of a sharper slowdown, the 
authorities have responded with fiscal, monetary and financial stimuli. In Latin America, 
the National Accounts data for Q4 showed the low growth in the two biggest economies, 
Brazil and Mexico, and the continuing recession in Argentina. The emerging economies’ 
monetary policies have generally held unchanged, in the face of the Federal Reserve’s 
more accommodative stance, and of the favourable behaviour of inflation (see Chart 4.2) 
and of the financial markets.
The sluggishness of euro area economic activity in late 2018 is a reflection of external 
and other domestic factors affecting specific countries and sectors 
In the euro area, the modest pace of economic activity continued to surprise. In Q4, 
GDP growth was 0.2% q-o-q, similar to the previous quarter and below expectations (see 
Chart 7.1). Country by country, the low figure was a reflection of almost zero GDP growth in 
Germany and a contraction in activity in Italy for the second quarter running (see Chart 7.2). 
3.2  The euro area and 
the European Central 
Bank’s monetary 
policy 
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SOURCES:CPB, Markit and own calculations.
The high-frequency indicators point to the continuation of the slowdown in the global economy at the start of 2019. The contraction in global trade was 
particularly sharp in the Asian economies, once the anticipation effect prior to the entry into force in September of higher US tariffs on Chinese products 
waned.
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The year-on-year increase stood at 1.2% in Q4, the result of an easing in the contribution 
of domestic demand and, above all, of net external demand. Private consumption 
moderated, against a background of lower employment growth. 
The slowdown in activity reflects a combination of external and domestic factors, in 
a setting of high uncertainty. As Box 2 explains, euro area external demand has dipped 
to a greater extent than world trade. Moreover, the uncertainty from the external 
environment is notably affecting business confidence and investment. There are also 
domestic factors affecting specific countries and sectors. These factors are exerting a 
more protracted effect than foreseen, especially those relating to the car industry. 
Euro area GDP growth forecasts have been revised notably downwards, especially for 
2019
The latest and mainly qualitative indicators tend to see this scenario of weakness 
running throughout the first half of 2019. Business and consumer confidence and export 
expectations have tended to become bleaker. In manufacturing the indicators point to a 
possible contraction in Q1. Few quantitative indicators are available. But they indicate a 
SOURCES: IFS and Banco de España.
a Percentage of labour force.
Developments in the main advanced economies were somewhat uneven. Inflation rates remained on a downward trend despite the favourable juncture
labour markets are at. Central banks have adopted a more cautious stance.
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slight improvement, especially in the IPI, following the strong adjustment it underwent in 
late 2018. Credit to firms, by contrast, has begun to show signs of slowing. The 
unemployment rate held stable at 7.8% in January. 
Against this backdrop, the growth outlook for the euro area has been revised 
downwards both by private analysts and official institutions, especially for 2019. The 
March ECB forecasting exercise subtracted 0.6 pp from GDP growth for this year, placing 
it at 1.1%. That is a reflection of the worse-than-expected behaviour in late 2018 and early 
2019. These forecasts mean that as the transitory factors that are affecting activity peter 
out, GDP will resume higher growth rates (see Table 2). Underpinning these will be 
favourable financial conditions, the increase in employment and wages, lower energy 
prices and a slightly expansionary fiscal policy. But this scenario is surrounded by downside 
SOURCES: IFS and Banco de España.
a A decrease in the index denotes a depreciation of the currency against the dollar.
b JP Morgan EMBI spreads. Latin America includes Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. Asia includes China, Indonesia, 
Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philiippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. The data on the new EU Member States relate to Hungary, Poland, Romania and, from 
July 2013, Croatia.
The emerging economies' financial markets performed favourably. This was reflected in stock markets, in currency appreciations and in a reduction in 
sovereign yields. On the commodities markets Brent oil prices have increased by more than 17% since mid-December.
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SOURCES: IFS and Banco de España.
a The aggregate of the different areas has been calculated using the weight of the countries that make up these areas in the world economy, drawing on IMF
 information.
b Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
c Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore, Philippines and Taiwan.
d Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and, from July 2013, Croatia.
Activity in the emerging economies has generally been less dynamic. Inflation, measured by the rate of change of consumer prices, has continued to 
decline.
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
LATIN AMERICA (b) EMERGING ASIA, EXCL. CHINA (c) NON-EURO AREA NEW EU MEMBER STATES (d) CHINA
1  GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (a)
Year-on-year rate
%
THE EMERGING ECONOMIES SLOW AND INFLATION EASES CHART 6
-2
0
2
4
6
8
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
2  CONSUMER PRICES (a)
Year-on-year rate
%
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
SOURCES: Eurostat, European Commission, Markit Economics and ECB.
The weakness of euro area economic activity continued to surprise in late 2018, and this scenario appears to be running into the first half of 2019. The 
low growth in Q4 reflected the practicaly zero GDP growth in Germany and the contraction in the Italian economy for the second consecutive quarter.
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risks: the possibility of a greater-than-expected slowdown in the Chinese economy; a 
disorderly Brexit; a heightening of protectionist measures in international trade; and, 
internally, the risk of financial tensions, owing to the economic recession and the fiscal 
uncertainty in Italy. 
The euro area inflationary scenario is also easing both in the short and medium term
Euro area inflation has declined owing to the effect of the energy component. The 
year-on-year growth of the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) stood at 1.5% in 
February. Meanwhile, the measures of inflation that exclude the most variable components 
have held stable at moderate levels of slightly over 1% (see Chart 8), with no signs yet 
apparent of the pass-through of wage increases to consumer prices. 
SOURCE: Eurostat.
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Euro area inflation has fallen to a rate of 1.5%, influenced by oil prices. Core inflation held at around 1%. There are no evident signs of a feed-through of 
higher labour costs to inflation.
120202029102
GDP HICP GDP HICP GDP HICP
European Central Bank (March 2019) 1.1 (-0.6) 1.2 (-0.4) 1.6 (-0.1) 1.5 (-0.2) 1.5 (0.0) 1.6 (-0.2)
European Commission (February 2019) 1.3 (-0.6) 1.4 (-0.4) 1.6 (-0.1) 1.5 (-0.1) — —
———)4.0-( 2.1—)8.0-( 0.1)9102 hcraM( DCEO
International Monetary Fund (January 2019) 1.6 (-0.3) — 1.7 (0,0) — — —
Consensus Forecast (February 2019) 1.3 (-0.2) 1.4 (-0.1) 1.4 (0.0) 1.5 (0.0) 1.2 (—) —
EURO AREA GDP AND HICP GROWTH PROJECTIONS TABLE 2
SOURCES: ECB, European Commission, Consensus Forecast, IMF and OECD.
a In brackets is the change relative to the previous forecast (December 2018 for the ECB, November 2018 for the EC and the OECD, October 2018 for the IMF and 
January 2019 for Consensus Forecast).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 36 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 1/2019 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
The March ECB forecasting exercise revised the headline and core inflation outlook 
downwards for the next three years. Inflation is expected to continue declining in 2019, 
as a result of the energy component. Subsequently, it will pick up gradually, on the back of 
less slackness in the economy, which will sustain wage growth. The ECB specifically 
expects the inflation rate to stand at 1.2%, 1.5% and 1.6% in 2019, 2020 and 2021, 
respectively (see Table 3). Core inflation, likewise revised downwards over the entire 
forecasting horizon, will post respective figures of 1.2 %, 1.4% and 1.6% in 2019, 2020 
and 2021. 
The macroeconomic imbalances are slowly being corrected 
In February the European Commission published the European Semester Winter 
Package. This comprises reports for the 28 EU countries, including the in-depth 
assessments of the 13 countries identified in the November 2018 early-warning mechanism. 
Three of them, namely Cyprus, Greece and Italy, have – according to the terminology used 
in the exercise – an excessive economic imbalance. The remaining 10 countries – Bulgaria, 
Germany, Spain, France, Croatia, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Sweden 
– have an economic imbalance. Generally, the Commission considers that the 
macroeconomic imbalances have continued to be corrected. That said, in some countries 
there are still vulnerabilities relating to high public and private debt, low profitability and 
asset quality in the banking sector, and the negative external position. 
With the end of net asset purchases, monetary policy retains a highly accommodative 
stance, strengthened by the Governing Council’s decisions in March 
Turning to monetary policy, the ECB Governing Council, at its meeting on 7 March, 
decided on new measures to preserve monetary stimulus. Given the downturn in the 
euro area growth outlook and the more moderate inflation scenario, the Governing Council 
adjusted its monetary policy (see Chart 9). First, it extended the period during which policy 
Monetary policy remains very expansionary following the ECB guidance on the extension of the period over which interest rates will hold at their current 
levels and on the size of its APP portfolio beyond the first rise in rates.
SOURCE: ECB.
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rates are expected to remain at their current low levels at least through the end of 2019, 
and in any case, as long as necessary to ensure the sustained convergence of inflation 
towards levels close to 2% in the medium term. Market expectations about the future 
course of policy rates changed along these lines (see Box 4). As regards the Asset Purchase 
Programme (APP), the ECB decided to continue reinvesting principal payments from 
maturing securities over a prolonged period, beyond the date of the first rise in rates. 
Moreover, the Council introduced a new series of longer-dated refinancing operations, 
to preserve favourable bank lending conditions. The new series of targeted long-term 
refinancing operations (TLTRO III) will be launched between September 2019 and March 
2021. The frequency will be quarterly, the term of maturity two years and the interest rate 
will be indexed to that on the main refinancing operations over the life of each operation. 
Lastly, the Council decided to maintain the full allotment procedure in monetary policy 
refinancing operations for as long as necessary, and at least until March 2021.
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4 THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
Financial conditions generally remained loose
Spanish stock markets performed very positively in the year to date and the Ibex-35 
gained as much as 8%. This performance is in line with the general favourable 
developments in international financial markets. The Spanish banking sector performed 
less positively than the overall index and the aggregate of European banks, partly owing to 
the publication of results for 2018 which were lower than analysts’ expectations. 
The cost of financing in the Spanish government debt market fell significantly in the 
early months of 2019. For instance, Spanish ten-year sovereign bond yields have fallen 
by approximately 25 bp since the beginning of the year. This reflects the compression of 
the risk premium relative to Germany and, to a greater degree, the downward adjustment 
in German ten-year bond yields in response to a more accommodative monetary policy 
stance.
In recent months, bank credit standards for households and non-financial corporations 
have remained very loose, although signs that this trend is tailing off are emerging. 
Average interest rates on new lending have remained low, although they increased 
somewhat in the final stretch of 2018 (see Chart 10.1). The Bank Lending Survey (BLS) 
shows that credit standards tightened slightly in 2018 Q4 in the consumer credit and other 
lending segment, which had not happened since the beginning of 2013 (see Chart 10.2). 
Furthermore, the banks anticipate that, for the first time since 2012, lending standards will 
tighten across all loan segments in 2019 Q1.
The positive growth rate of the Spanish economy has continued, despite the 
unfavourable developments in the international environment. 
The Spanish economy slowed down over 2018 against a background of a worsening 
international environment and heightened uncertainty. Specifically, GDP climbed by 
2.5% – 0.5 percentage points (pp) less than in 2017 – recording a similar performance to 
that of employment, against a backdrop of the improved financial situation of the non-financial 
private sector and favourable financial conditions. The deceleration of GDP was a result of 
the negative contribution from net external demand (see Chart 11), following its positive 
contribution during the two previous years. Exports slowed down more sharply than 
imports owing to the much less buoyant performance of Spain’s main export markets, the 
delayed effect of the 2017 euro appreciation and, possibly, the negative transitory impact 
of new regulations on vehicle emissions. Domestic demand continued to contribute 
positively to aggregate growth, at a similar level to the previous year, but it started to flag 
in 2018 Q4.
According to the Banco de España’s updated projections, GDP continued to post 
robust growth at the beginning of 2019, despite slowing somewhat. GDP is projected 
to rise by 0.6%, as compared with 0.7% in 2018 Q4. Although these projections were 
made against a backdrop of weak global demand, the pick-up in GDP would, however, be 
in line with the average increase observed in 2018. Thus, it is estimated that GDP growth 
will continue to be underpinned by national demand in 2019 Q1. Residential and business 
investment will behave less unfavourably than in the closing months of 2018 and private 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 39 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 1/2019 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
SOURCES: Morgan Stanley, Datastream and Banco de España.
a The cost of equity is based on the three-stage Gordon dividend discount model.
b Bank Lending Survey. Indicator = percentage of banks that have tightened their credit standards or their margins considerably × 1 + percentage of banks that 
have tightened their credit standards or their margins somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that have eased their credit standards or margins somewhat × 1/2 
– percentage of banks that have eased their credit standards or margins considerably × 1.
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Bank credit standards have remained loose. Costs have generally continued to be stable, although the Bank Lending Survey points to a tightening of 
credit standards for consumer credit and other lending. For the first time since 2012, the banks anticipate a tightening in all segments in the first quarter 
of 2019.
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consumption will continue to increase, whereas the contribution of external demand, for 
which only very limited information is yet available, would be slightly negative.
Employment will slow more sharply than activity in Q1. Employment will grow by 0.4% 
in the January-March period, 0.2 pp down on the previous three-month period, based on 
available information on social security registrations, which points to this variable slowing 
down in the first few months of the year (see Chart 12). 
The loss of momentum in exports is sharper in goods 
The slightly negative contribution of the external sector in Q1 reflects similar growth 
of exports and imports. Nevertheless, in the opening months of the year transactions 
with the rest of the world showed a slowing profile (see Chart 13), which was slightly more 
pronounced in exports. The behaviour of sales abroad reflects the worsening outlook for 
world markets, including the euro area, Spain’s main export market. Accordingly, the 
indicators of the outlook for foreign orders were recently seen to be contractionary. 
However, the depreciation of the euro against the major currencies since the beginning of 
this year could contribute to supporting sales abroad, given that its appreciation since 
2017 would be reversed, at least in part. The sensitivity of Spain’s exports to price 
competitiveness is relatively high, owing in part to their composition, since low and 
medium-low technology-intensive products have a higher relative weight than in the main 
euro area countries. Import performance is estimated to be consistent with final demand, 
thus a portion of the deceleration of purchases from the rest of the world is linked to export 
performance, given the high import content of exports in certain industries, such as the 
automotive industry.
The loss of momentum of goods exports was widespread in terms of products and 
markets. According to the most recent customs data, real goods exports declined across 
the board, except for exports of capital goods, in particular consumer durables, including 
vehicles and energy products. By geographical area, the decrease was more pronounced 
in non-EU sales, against a backdrop of a significant appreciation of the euro, particularly 
against certain currencies of emerging countries. Real imports also decreased across the 
As a result of ongoing highly buoyant job creation, there is a protracted downward trend in the unemployment rate.
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board in terms of products, particularly non-energy intermediate goods, except for non-food 
and non-durable consumer goods, and especially energy products.
As for exports of services, the main indicators of foreign tourism have picked up 
considerably in recent months. Total tourist spending rebounded owing to the favourable 
developments in overnight stays in hotels and inflows of foreign tourists. The increase in 
foreign tourist numbers was quite broad-based across tourism-generating markets, 
including Britain, despite the ongoing weak performance of tourists from Germany.
The external downturn largely explains the poorer performance of industrial activity 
compared with other sectors
By sector, noteworthy was the contraction of industrial activity, in common with the 
advanced countries, which was amply offset by the buoyancy of services and 
construction. The fall in industrial activity in the second half of 2018 could continue in the 
initial months of 2019, according to certain available indicators, such as the manufacturing 
THE BEHAVIOUR OF SALES ABROAD REFLECTS THE WORSENING OF THE OUTLOOK FOR WORLD MARKETS CHART 13
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PMI, although the available information is still very limited. The performance of industry is 
highly influenced by the unfavourable developments in the external environment. However, 
available short-term economic information shows that the growth rates of services and 
construction could remain significant and similar to those recorded in previous quarters. 
Employment, according to data on social security registrations, shows a very similar 
performance at large sectors to that estimated for industrial activity.
The Spanish economy is showing more resilience than the euro area on account of 
internal demand, although there are risks to the continuation of the strong rate of 
consumption
The Spanish economy is showing greater resilience to the global slowdown than the 
main euro area countries. In this regard, estimated quarter-on-quarter growth of 0.6% for 
2019 Q1 contrasts with the available projections of around 0.2% for the euro area as a 
whole. The higher rate of increase of the Spanish economy is mainly linked to buoyant 
private domestic demand, as occurred in 2018.
Among the main demand components, private consumption is estimated to remain 
buoyant in the first quarter. Based on available information, this component is estimated 
to continue growing at a similar rate to that observed in the October-December period, of 
around 0.5% (see Chart 14). Although spending indicators generally performed robustly, it 
should be underlined that in recent quarters consumer confidence has been showing a 
sustained deterioration. Job creation and favourable financial conditions continue to act 
as a support for the buoyancy of consumption. As for product type, recent developments 
in consumption seem to be sustained to a greater degree by spending on durable and 
semi-durable goods, whereas spending on durable consumer goods could be slowing 
down according to the available partial indicators. This is in line with the estimated gradual 
petering out of the reabsorption of pent-up demand for this type of goods which was the 
driver behind the marked buoyancy of consumption during the early stages of the recovery. 
The growth of consumption is coupled with a lower saving rate and high growth of 
credit earmarked for financing this type of purchases. This poses risks to the 
continuity of the strength observed in private consumption. The saving rate, on the 
latest available data, once again posted a record low, in a setting where households 
increased their financing needs. The volume of new consumer loans continued to rise 
significantly. That said, their rate of increase eased in the final stretch of 2018 as, according 
to the BLS, new loan applications came to a halt and lending conditions tightened slightly. 
This would signal a continuation of these developments in Q1, as anticipated by the banks. 
By contrast, households’ financial wealth is estimated to have strengthened further in 
2018 Q4 with the continued contraction of debt and debt burden ratios relative to gross 
disposable income. The buoyancy of income and the recovery of wealth would have been 
maintained, underpinned by higher house prices, which offset the decline in the financial 
component associated with the fall in stock prices. 
Residential investment continues to perform favourably. Following the decline of the 
previous three months, residential investment is expected to recover in Q1, as suggested 
by the expectations for the construction sector and its activity indicators, and the relative 
buoyancy of the real estate market, both as regards prices and housing sales and 
purchases. However, the most recent data on loans for house purchase show some 
slowdown in activity, which, according to the BLS, may reflect weaker demand. 
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Real estate market activity and price trends again show a high degree of geographical 
heterogeneity. Although the real estate market has picked up virtually throughout the 
whole of Spain, there are notable regional differences, both in terms of transactions and 
prices. The most positive developments were observed in large cities and on the coast, 
where activity is more buoyant, foreign demand stronger and there is a higher density of 
population. 
The growth profile of investment in capital goods and intangibles is expected to 
recover in Q1, following the poor figures of 2018 Q4 (see Chart 15). This highly volatile 
national demand component performed unfavourably, against a background of heightened 
external and internal uncertainty, in particular, about the outlook for foreign trade and 
economic policy. That said, the available information points to improved investment in 
capital goods and intangibles in 2019 Q1, despite the continued worsening of uncertainty 
indicators. The generally favourable information available is in keeping with the continuation 
of the broader economic upturn, the positive earnings expectations, the need for equipment 
renewal in a context of high capacity utilisation, and the ongoing accommodative financial 
conditions. The financial position of non-financial corporations continued to strengthen in 
Private consumption will continue to show relatively high growth rates in 2019 Q1, although the low saving rate and slowdown of credit pose risks to the 
continuation of this strength in the medium term.
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2018 Q4. In this period, the financial burden continued to decrease, albeit slightly, and the 
indebtedness ratio remained at similar levels to those of the previous quarter.
Despite being generally positive, external financing of non-financial corporations 
has slowed in recent months. Noteworthy was the loss of momentum of bank lending, 
one of the components of this financing. According to the BLS, this would essentially be 
explained by demand factors.
The course of fiscal policy remains unclear
In recent months, a number of fiscal policy measures were adopted, affecting both 
revenue and expenditure. These measures were approved under the Spanish 
Parliament’s rejection of the State Budget submitted by the Government in January. 
That entailed further extending the 2018 budget which had come into force at the 
beginning of the year. Although most of the budget items remain set at the nominal 
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levels of the previous year, the same does not apply to the items affected by the royal 
decrees approved by Parliament,2 insofar as they can be financed through budget 
appropriations.3
Against this backdrop, the fiscal policy stance is expected to be expansionary, 
according to the Banco de España’s general government deficit estimates, excluding 
cyclical factors. Although there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the quantification 
and degree of implementation of the different fiscal policy measures during the year, these 
may provide some stimulus for the economy in the short term. According to the latest 
information, tax revenues remain robust, as in recent quarters, and are expected to partly 
offset the rise in government spending and enable the deficit to remain on a correction 
path in the first part of the year. However, the expansionary nature of fiscal policy would 
also further deteriorate the underlying state of public finances, which makes the economy 
vulnerable, in the aforementioned context of global uncertainty, and reduces the leeway 
for fiscal policy in the short and medium term.
In this scenario, the European authorities will be assessing whether Spanish general 
government has overcome the “excessive deficit” situation. In the first half of 2019, 
the EU Council is expected to confirm an exit scenario from the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
applied to the Spanish general government since 2009, as part of the “corrective arm” of 
the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. To this end, the authorities shall assess whether the 
budget deficit held steadily below 3% of GDP in 2018. Although the latest available data 
seem to confirm that the deficit in 2018 was below the 3% reference, the estimate for the 
2019 budget balance is less certain, since there are no guiding principles in place.
Low dynamism of prices in the absence of external inflationary pressures and wage 
rises
Inflation, as measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), slowed 
early in the year to 1.1% in February, from 1.8% in 2018 Q4 (see Chart 16). This decline 
was across the board, affecting not only the more stable components of the index, but 
also the more volatile ones, of energy and food (see Chart 16). Core inflation, as measured 
by the HICP excluding energy and food, stood at 0.7% in February, in year-on-year terms, 
in a setting in which the output gap, which measures the degree of capacity utilisation, is 
expected to have widened. In terms of components, services slowed significantly, to 
1.2%, compared with 1.6% in 2018 Q4, while the prices of non-energy industrial goods 
held virtually flat as in previous quarters.
Weaker external inflationary pressures are mainly associated with lower oil prices. In 
the early months of the year, oil prices are expected to be lower than in 2018. But they will 
move on an upward path, which would stabilise from Q2, according to the information 
from futures markets. 
2  These measures included most notably, in terms of their scale, on the expenditure side, the revaluation of 
pensions linked to expected HICP (RDL 27/2018 of 28 December 2018), and public-sector wage rises, according 
to the agreement reached with the unions in the sector (RDL 24/2018 of 28 December 2018), as well as the 
increase in paternity leave to eight weeks (RDL 6/2019 of 7 February 2019) and in unemployment benefits for 
persons over 52 years old (RDL 8/2019 of 8 March 2019). With respect to government revenue, an increase in the 
minimum contribution base was approved as a result of the national minimum wage increase, and of 7% in the 
maximum contribution bases (RDL 27/2018 of 28 December 2018).
3  For more details, see Box 1 (“Macroeconomic projections for Spain [2019-2021]”) in this report. Also noteworthy 
is the impact on government revenue of the Supreme Court ruling of October 2018, which stipulates that 
maternity and paternity benefits are exempt from personal income tax.
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SOURCES: INE, Eurostat, Reuters, Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social and Banco de España.
a Calculation of indices based on PPI and IPRIM (import price index for industrial products) items reflected in the HICP.
b Based on information to February 2019.
c Break-even inflation calculated on the basis of inflation swaps.
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Inflation in Spain has grown at a slower pace than in the euro area as a whole, while core inflation has followed a similar pattern, in a context o  wage 
increases and contained external pressures.
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Inflation in the euro area as a whole followed similar patterns by component, but was 
higher than in Spain. Thus, the growth rate of the HICP stood at 1.5% in February, 
according to the leading indicator. As a result, Spain’s inflation differential vis-à-vis the 
euro area is expected to remain negative.
Inflation in Spain in recent months has been lower than expected. This has led to the 
downward revision of the projections for HICP and HICP excluding energy and food for 
2019 as a whole, as explained in greater detail in the box on this issue in this report. In 
addition, agents’ medium-term inflation expectations also reflect moderating inflation, 
possibly as a result of the uncertainty surrounding the macroeconomic performance of the 
euro area, and of Spain.
As for costs, the wage indicators have accelerated recently, which, a priori, may lead 
to stronger domestic inflationary pressures in the future. The wage rates set in 
collective bargaining agreements have risen significantly, based on data to February, and 
cover a very high number of employees. Specifically, the wage increase agreed for 2019 is 
2.2% on average, 0.5 pp higher than in 2018. For now, the vast majority of these agreements 
were signed in previous years, and little information is available on newly signed 
agreements. The increases in the newly signed agreements may factor in the above-
mentioned rise in the national minimum wage, insofar as they pass it on, at least partially, 
to the rest of the wage distribution, although this is subject to a high degree of uncertainty. 
Also, there are doubts as to the extent to which higher wage costs pass through to prices. 
In many euro area countries, profit margins are acting as a buffer, such that the higher 
wage increases are not being reflected in prices, at least for the time being. 
13.3.2019.
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ADAPTING LENDING POLICIES AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF NEGATIVE INTEREST 
RATES
Óscar Arce, Miguel García-Posada and Sergio Mayordomo
Published on 12 March 2019
Since June 2014 the European Central Bank (ECB) has placed its deposit facility interest rate 
(DFR) at negative levels. Against this background, the question arises as to whether maintaining 
negative interest rates over a prolonged period can adversely affect credit institutions’ net 
interest income and, ultimately, the supply of credit. Euro area banks’ responses to the Bank 
Lending Survey (BLS) enable the banks to be classified into two groups, depending on whether 
their net interest income has been impaired or not by the negative rates (“affected” versus 
“unaffected” banks). The analysis in this article shows that the affected banks are generally not 
as well capitalised. This circumstance might have hindered these banks from taking on fresh 
risks under their lending policy in order to attempt to offset the adverse effect of the negative 
rates on their unit lending margins. Indeed, the banks most affected by negative interest rates 
tightened the terms and conditions on their loans to a greater extent than those unaffected, to 
optimise their risk-weighted assets and, therefore, their capital ratios. Lastly, the article shows 
there are no differences between both groups of banks as regards the total credit offered and 
that the credit supply has been adapted via loan terms and conditions and not through the total 
amount offered. This result suggests that the current level of the DFR (-0.4%) is not causing a 
contraction in the volume of credit supplied by the banks affected.
THE EUROSYSTEM’S MONETARY POLICY FOLLOWING THE END OF NET ASSET 
PURCHASES
Óscar Arce, Galo Nuño and Carlos Thomas
Published on 21 February 2019
This article analyses the monetary policy conduct framework in the euro area following the end 
of net purchases under the financial asset purchase programme. First, there is a review of the 
monetary policy measures since 2014 and of the ECB’s announcements on the future course of 
its instruments, comparing the recent changes in euro area monetary policy with the 
normalisation of US monetary conditions initiated by the Federal Reserve in 2013. Second, the 
authors analyse the main instruments currently available to the ECB (forward guidance on 
interest rates and its asset portfolio reinvestment policy), and discuss how both instruments 
provide monetary stimulus in the current setting.
THE LOAN TO VALUE RATIO FOR HOUSING IN SPAIN OVER THE PERIOD 2004-2016
Olympia Bover, María Torrado and Ernesto Villanueva
Published on 12 February 2019 
The ratio between the amount of mortgage loans and the value of housing (the loan to value 
ratio) is a useful indicator for studying the financial situation of households. Two main price 
indicators are used to measure loan to value ratios for housing in Spain at the time of purchase: 
the transaction price recorded at the Property Registry and the appraisal value. Having 
generated a sample in which both price indicators refer to the same set of housing, the median 
loan to value ratio between 2004 and 2007 is found to stand between 70%, when the appraisal 
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value is used, and 107%, when the transaction price is used. The difference between these two 
ratios narrowed from 2010, with the loan to value ratio using the appraisal value remaining at 
around 70%, while the ratio based on the transaction value fell to 80%. The Spanish Survey of 
Household Finances (EFF), conducted by the Banco de España, is an alternative data source, 
allowing a loan to value ratio to be obtained directly from households’ responses. This ratio, 
based on EFF data, has evolved in a similar way to the one derived from the transaction prices 
recorded at the Property Registry.
THE JANUARY 2019 BANK LENDING SURVEY IN SPAIN
Álvaro Menéndez Pujadas
Published on 22 January 2019 
In 2018 Q4, according to the Bank Lending Survey (BLS), credit standards for consumer credit 
and other lending to households tightened slightly both in Spain and in the euro area. There 
were no appreciable changes in the other two lending segments. For the current quarter, 
Spanish banks anticipated a slight tightening in all lending segments, a development also 
observable in the euro area – albeit to a lesser degree – in practically all segments. The overall 
terms and conditions on new loans eased across the board, both in Spain and, more moderately, 
in the euro area as a whole. In Spain, the demand for credit fell both in loans to enterprises and 
loans to households for house purchase, and it ceased to grow in consumer credit and other 
lending to households; in the euro area as a whole, meantime, loan applications grew across the 
board. Conditions of access to wholesale funding markets worsened, both in Spain and in the 
euro area, whereas in retail markets the changes were minor and of a different sign. According 
to the banks surveyed, regulatory and supervisory measures in respect of capital, leverage and 
liquidity did not exert an appreciable impact on the supply of credit in Spain in the second half 
of 2018, whereas in the euro area they prompted some tightening. Finally, the NPL ratio did not 
exert any influence on Spanish banks’ lending policy in the second half of 2018, while in the 
euro area they contributed to some tightening in the supply of credit in all segments.
SPANISH BANKS’ INTERNATIONALISATION STRATEGY: CHARACTERISTICS AND 
COMPARISON
Isabel Argimón
Published on 10 January 2019
Banks’ international strategy and the way in which they have expanded are explanatory factors 
for the economic effects of their activity. Based on information from individual institutions, the 
internationalisation strategies of banks based in Spain, the Netherlands and the United States 
have been compared. In addition, in the Spanish case, whether banks’ risk, efficiency, return 
and income source type differ according to the chosen model of internationalisation has been 
tested. The results of this comparison point to Spanish banks with subsidiaries and branches 
abroad having higher returns but also higher costs than banks whose foreign business is mainly 
cross-border.
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COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with the protocol order, the EU Member States are listed 
using the alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EUR (euro)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
HR Croatia HRK (Croatian kuna)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia EUR (euro)
LT Lithuania EUR (euro)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
ABS Asset-backed securities
APP Asset Purchase Programme
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
BOE Official State Gazette
CBA Central Balance Sheet Data Office Annual Survey
CBQ Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey
CBSO Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Central Credit Register
CDSs Credit default swaps
CESR Committee of European Securities Regulators
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
CPI Consumer Price Index
CSPP Corporate sector purchase programme
DGF Deposit Guarantee Fund
EBA European Banking Authority
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and 
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESA 2010 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FROB Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GOP Gross operating profit
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
ICO Official Credit Institute
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IGAE National Audit Office
IIP International Investment Position
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
LTROs Longer-term refinancing operations
MFIs Monetary financial institutions
MROs Main refinancing operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NAIRU Non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment
NCBs National central banks
NFCs Non-financial corporations
NiGEM National Institute Global Econometric Model
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONP Ordinary net profit
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PER Price/earnings ratio
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SAFE ECB Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TFP Total factor productivity
TLTROs Targeted longer-tem refinancing operations
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
WTO World Trade Organization
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money 
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed 
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.
H1, H2 Calendar half-years.
bn Billions (109).
m Millions.
bp Basis points.
pp Percentage points.
... Not available.
— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignificance 
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the final digit shown in the series.
